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It is universally agreed today that tréhdë in' population variables ànd economic 
and social development are closely interrelated; that the dë'gree and -characteristics 
of development determine the levels 'arid trends of population variai)lès; and that 
they, in their turn, have significant ^répercussions on deveibpmëht. This consensus 
was incorporated as a fundamental principle of thé World' Population Plan of Action 
adopted at the World Population Conference in 1974, whose explicit aim is to help 
harmonize population trends and the trends of economic and social development. 
To that end the Plan suggests to countries the formulation and application of 
population policies integrated with development stratégies and policies. 
The member States of the United Nations will shortly be meeting at an 
international population conference of which the basic objective is to evaluate 
the results of the application, of the Plan. Undoubtedly, one of the most 
important aspects of this appraisal will be the study of the countries' experience 
with regard to the integration of population policies in the development planning 
process. Obviously, knowledge of the relations between the behaviour of population 
variables and socio-economic change in the countries' specific historical 
situations is an indispensable element for the achievement of this integration. 
Firstly, as the aim is directly or indirectly to affect demographic variables, 
the reason is that their trends are not considered consonant with development, 
or that evaluation of their economic, social and political effects shows or 
suggests alternative and more advantageous trends. Secondly, the possibility 
of exchanging current trends for others that are felt to be more advantageous 
depends upon knowledge of the economic, social and cultural factors which 
determined them, likewise in concrete instances. 
Discussion of the specific socio-economic and cultural factors that have 
determined population trends in the countries of the region and the various 
economic and social repercussions which these trends have produced, is, therefore, 
the focal point of the problems posed by the formulation of population policies 
integrated with development strategies and policies. 
The present document makes no claim whatever to be an inventory of existing 
knowledge on the relations between economic and social development and demographic 
change in the Latin American countries. It merely endeavours to present the most 
outstanding occurrences in the recent evolution of these processes, and to put 
forward a few propositions that may serve as a basis for the discussion of some 
of their most important interrelationships. 
Section I offers a synthesis of the recent situations and trends of 
population and economic and social development in the region. The population 
growth process is described, together with its components, changes in age structure 
and the results of the population projections currently extant. This is followed 
by a summary of the main characteristics and trends of the spatial distribution 
of the population, including changes in its patterns and the principal trends 
in. urbanization and urban concentration. Next comes a resume of some of the most 
outstanding' characteristics of economic and social development which are considered 
relevant for the interpretation of population trends and their implications. 
/Section II 
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Section II presents elements for ,the analysis of the factors determining 
demographic change. The economic, social and cultural factors that influence 
fertility and mortality are considered, together with the need to include them 
in an integrated approach whereby to,account for the changes in the variables 
in question. Attention is then ¡devoted to|he contributions and limitations; of 
the studies ¿escribing... change?"in' #©rt|iity. and. mortalityrelation to certain 
socio-economic indicatorsandthe necessity of carrying out research by means of 
which those changes canbe; explained. lastly, a-few conclusions are, put forward 
with respect to the formulation of policies to modify, the components of natural 
growth. ... "...'. ..... .'• 
In the last section a few general considerations are presented on the 
implications of demographic change, as well as some background material for the 
examination of its relations with-the labour force and employment, the implications 
of urban-metropolitan concentration, migration and employment in the big' cities, 
the organization of urban space and the relations between urban size, environmental 
deterioration and urbanization costs. 
/I. DEMOGRAPHIC 
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'•iE. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND- DEVELOPMENT ' 
This chapter will give a brief presentation of the most outstanding aspects of 
demographic evolution in Latin America, as well :'as sorte important aspects of the 
region's economic and social development which aré of-special significance fcii? an 
analysis of thé process of demographic changé and its'possible economic and Social 
iniiplic'ations. :•'• 1 " '.'. .y:'..-.:-"-.- r,: •• • r v.-
. l. Population growth 1/ . : 
The population of Latin America "grew at an extraordinary rate -more rapidly than 
any other region o"f the world- after the Second World War. It increased from 
approximately 159 million inhabitants 'in 1950 to 209 million in; I960,, 2-75 million 
in 1970 and about 352 million in 1580."a • : ^ . : 
» The rate of populatiott- gróirth-acbeleratéd until it peaked at over 2.8% during 
the'.¡first? ha&Lf-of the 19?0s;!'it. tHén"fcegaft-'to'; decrease steadily, and currently is 
slightly over 2.3% annually. Nonetheless, it took only 26 years for the population 
existing in 1954 to double. 
Growth varied widely from cóüntry tó côuntry. In Venezuela, where it was 
the most rapid, the population doubled in 20 years. At the other extreme, in the 
countries where the process of demographic transition was furthest advanced 
(Argentina, Chile, Cübaand Uruguay), 35 years or more passed before this occurred. 
In the vast majority of "the remaining countries* -it took no more than 26 years for 
the population to double. 
The growth' oï the Regional populatióri fcame about as "St result of. very different 
trends in the Various countries. ' In-Argentina, Cíübá and Ürüguayv grówtlí ratés were 
already below 2% at the beginning of the 1950s; in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and : -
Costa Rica, they began to decline in 1960-1965, and the same thing has occurred 
more recently in the Dominican Republic, Mexicoi Panatna, Peru and Venezuela; in 
contrast, the rate of growth has remained high in the rest of the countries, or has 
evèn aôcelèfrated, as in the cases of Bolivia aftd Haiti. -<•• 
The trend of the growth rates in the region was révërsed when thé process of 
declining fertility spread to a growiiig number of countries, while mortality 
continued its downward course at a rate which varied according to the time period 
and the country. , ; , 
The regional crude birth rate remained high, over 40 per thousand, until the 
first half of the 1960s, and thereafter decreased until- reaching its present value 
of under 32 per thousand as a consequence 6f a decrease iri 'all the countries (except 
Ar^ehtina, where it has fluctuated between 22 'and 25 per thousand). In 1-950-1965, 
only four countries (Argentina,*; Chile, Cuba and Uruguay) had crude birth rates " 
under 40 per thousand; rare thañ''half of'the'remaining-countries had-rates'Of:>Ov"er 
45 per thousand. This situation rapidly changed, and there are now only six 
countries, with less than 99 Of the re^ioh1's population, which "have--rates'1 b'f over 
40 per1 thousand, none of which has reached 45 per thousand.' "' 
/The total 
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The total fertility rate 2/ for the region decreased from 6 to sicklyvv, 
over 4. At first, only four countries had a total fertility rate of less? thâii^5.5, 
whereas currently the vast majority is in this category. 
-The other component in the naLtural increase of the population ,«mortality-
has also undergone significant changes during the last 20. years. "Life expectancy 
at birth rose from 56.8 years in 1960-1965 to 64.4 years in 1980-1985; the slower 
increase during the past decade is to be expected in view of the increasingly high 
levels attained. For the same reason, the increase in life expectancy at birth 
was, in general, more rapid in the countries,with higher mortality rates, thereby 
causing a progressive concentration of them at the lower mortality levels. In 
1960-1965, there were only six countries (Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama, 
Uruguay and Venezuela) with a life expectancy at birth of over 60 years, and 
another six (Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru) where it was 
under 50 years. There are currently 15 countries in the first category and none 
in the second. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the range of variation in life 
expectancy at birth has decreased over the last'^O yearé,:there are still great 
differences among the countries, with differentials of over 22 years in extreme 
cases. . 
These changes in life expectancy caused the crude death rate to, decline, more 
slowly than the crude birth rate, from 12,4 per thousand in 1960-1965 to 8.2 in 
1S80-:1985: and, consequently,- the ria-tUrSI:-;'-i$î ease of• the regional population -slowed. 
This did not. occur in alVo'f the'-.ccmirèr^êil^hôweverIn some, where the mortality 
indices were ttië ¿begi^j'în^^ . 1.970s ,• the rates of-natural 
increase remained high or éVe« rdëe, !às'in' Boiivia and Haiti. 
Thesi third component of ppj)ulati^i ^>Wth -international migration- has not 
yet been measured satisfactorily. However', as a factor of population-growth, its 
quantitative importance is considered to be residual, both for the region and for 
some countries. 
• .'••"'';.'. 2. Changes in àgëf distribution 3/ 
The nature of the process of transition toward ever lower levels of mortality and 
fertility determines both the pace of population growth and the changes in its 
age-sex distribution. These changes depend upon the variations in mortality and 
especially in fertility in the various generations which make up the population. 
Between 1950 and 1970, the distribution by broad age group of the population 
of Latin America only experienced slight variations. The proportion of young 
people (under 15 years of age) only increased from 40.7% to 42.4%. Meanwhile, the 
proportion of people of working age. (15 to 64 years) fell from 56% to less than 
54%, while the percentage of older persons (65 years and older) rose from 3.3% to 
3.9%. The rejuvention at the base and the aging at the apex of the age pyramid 
resulted from the maintenance of high fertility levels and the rapid decline of 
mortality, especially during the first ten years of the period. 
More recently, after 1970, a highly significant change began to occur in the 
trends of the proportions of young people and people of working age. As a result 
of the decline in fertility, the former fell to 39.4% in 1980, producing an almost 
/equivalent increase 
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equivalent increase in the latter, which reached 56.4%. -At the^éame-time¿-the 
proportion of the aged continued to grow slowly, reaching 4;2%.-1.These proportions 
aré significantly different 'from those in other developing regions* but they are 
still far removed from the proportions corresponding to the developed countries ;. 
as a. gt'o^p.U /. ' /'.'.' • ; " .  • Or.r. 
The kiiaiysis of age;'diét^Ìbutiòn ;-in thè various'countries clearly'shows that 
the countries which are furthest %lóhg; in 'thè process of demographic transition . . 
(Argentina, Chile, Cuba and Uruguay) have a lower proportion of young people 
(30%-33%), and a higher proportion -of adults (61%-63%) and agéd. (S%-11%). 
In all of the countries, èxeëpt•foi' those*with the highest mortality (Bolivia. 
Haiti and Honduras), there was a downward trend in the proportion of the population 
under 15 years of age; nevertheless, it is still òVèr'40% in more than half of the 
countries in the region. In contrast, the proportion of people of working age 
tended to rise in the vast majbrityiSfejjttie- It. decreased only in the 
three countries with the highest mortality, and in Argentina and Uruguay, which 
together with Chile and Cwba are the only countries; where:-these people represent 
more than 60% of thè population. The proportion of people over 65 years of age is 
very low in almost all of the countries, but is showing a tendency to grow slowly. 
Older persons constitute more than ;5%; of the population only in the four countries 
whicjirsre furthest'" along -iti1-the 'tráíteition. . r. 
These changes in the âge distribution óf the Latin American population result 
frorç different growth trends in the various age groups. The mean annual growth 
-uridetf'-li yesOís of age slowed from 3.3% in 1950-1960 to 1.7% 
d&àjng'.tì»'jatët£?¡cade. ! Thè'growth of the working-age population, however, 
accáeíáf^^^rf'-iZ'.Sl' tò 3.0& during the sâme periods. At the same time, the older 
..gQÇiulatiÔtt. the slowest-growing group (2il%) duringthe 1950s- became , 
'the^fástéSt-'^ÍQWíng gróúp during the past decade* (3.3%K. In the. vast majority of 
thè countries', ' the changes in thè gróvrtrh rate 'of the three age. groups being 
cònsideréd'followed a páttérh similar to thé régional pattern (a declining rate of 
increase oí the young population ánd rising rates for the other two-groups);, 
however, there was :a wide variation in the magnitude of these changes according 
to the òasè, in close and direct relàtion to changes in fertility. ; 
The changes observed iii "the !Mge distribution of the population are reflected 
by significant changes in some indicators related to the size of the age group?, 
being considered Which are useful in estimating the potential effects of such 
changes on the economy and society. For Latin America as a whole, the dependency 
index 5/ is currently very high, and grew Slightly from 84% to 86% between 1960 
and 1?T0; however, it later began to decrease'Rapidly., and reached 77% in 1980. 
In i960, except in Argentina, Chile, Cuba and Urùguay, the dependency index was 
over 80%, and exceeded 100% in Costai'RÌCa, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. 
It rose even higher in the 1960s9 or remained at high levels, in most of the 
çpuntries; howevér, the decline became^ widespread in the following decade, and in 
1980 another four countries (Brazil-, Colombia, Costa.Rica and Venezuela) joined 
the group of countries having indices under 80%. 
/Another indicator 
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Another.indicator which aids in an evaluation of the potential effects of 
changes in the age distribution of the population is the proportion of older 
people within the population which is not of working age. In all the countries 
and in Latin America as a whole, this indicator showed an upward trend between 
1960 and 1980 (it rose from 6.8% to 9.6%). By the end of the period all the 
countries except Argentina, Chile» Cuba and Uruguay, had indices under 11%; in 
general.there was a.direct relationship between the size of this percentage and 
the extent to which the demographic transition had advanced in the countries. 
In Latin America as a whole, the ratio between the working-age population 
and the older population in retirement dropped from 17.5 in 1960 to 13.4 in 1980; 
this decrease was more rapid during the first,half of that period. The country 
indices remained stable in many cases, or declined slowly, but they only reached 
values of less than 10 in Argentina, Chile,, Cuba and Uruguay. 
3. Projections of; demographic change 
The most recent data and demographic analyses have confirmed two facts which, in 
conjunction, have led to the revision of the.growth projections for many countries 
of the region. The first and most important as regards the magnitude of its 
effect on growth is that the, decline in fertility after 1960 was more rapid than 
had been estimated. The second -which also contributed, although to a lesser 
degree, to the decrease in the population growth rate to a lower level than had 
been expected- is that mortality was higher than had been estimated. 
Thè foregoing emerges clearly from a comparison of current estimates 6/ for 
the 1960-1985 period with: the estimates and projections for th§-same period whiph 
were in use in early 19.75, shortly, after the World Population Conference approved 
the World Population Plan of .¡Action. 7/ The latter overestimated;, the 1980 
population of Latin America by more than 11 million. The new projections,whose 
preparation incorporates the latest Jaiowledge about past demographic evolution, 
presents a significantly different picture of regional population growth than the 
picture given by the projections in use in 1975. According to the. medium . 
hypothesis proposed on the basis of those projections, the population of Latin 
America would reach 611.2 million by the year 2000, which is ,76.6 million people 
more (over 14%) than the population estimated for that year by the new projections 
(534.6 million). This lastrfigure is even lower than the. figure corresponding to 
the low hypothesis of the previous projections (560.5 million), which is defined 
in United Nations publications as the lower limit of reasonable deviation. 
In the large majority of the countries, the new projections for the year 
2000 indicate a lower population than was. previously estimated. Nevertheless, 
the difference in the regional total is almost entirely due to changes in the 
estimates for a few countries -Brazil, Colombia and-Mexico- whose combined 
population at the end of the century will be: approximately 70 million inhabitants 
lower than previously estimated. Two of the small number of countries whose 
population will grow more rapidly than was estimated in the 1975 projections are 
Argentina and Venezuela, which will have 4.3 million and 1.1 million more 
inhabitants, respectively, in the year 2000. 
/The slower 
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The slower growth of the regional population forecast by the new projections 
results from a more rapid decline of fertility and a slower decrease in mortality 
than had been posited in previous projections. 
It is now expected that the regional population growth rate will steadily 
fall from 2.3% annually in 1980-1985 to less than 1.9% during the last five years 
of this century. This would be the result of a drop in the total fertility rate 
from 4.1 to 3.2 and of an increase in life expectancy at birth from 64.4 to 68.6 
during the;, same period. 
Based on the projections, the rate of population growth will diminish in 
almost all of the countries. Growth will accelerate only in those with the highest 
mortality (Bolivia and Haiti). .In Cuba and Uruguay, the two countries where growth 
is the slowest, the rate will not exceed 1% annually between 1980 and the.year 
2000. As a result of these trends, 10 countries -which together will, have more 
than three-fourths of the Latin American population- will have growth rates of. 
under 2% annually by the end of the century. However, in four Central American 
countries, in addition to Bolivia; Haiti and Ecuador -which together account for 
13% of the population of the region? the population will still increase by more 
than 2.7% per year. 
These trends in the.countries' population-growth stem from the overall . 
reduction of fertility and mortality at rates which vary from case to case; thus, 
in the future, the range of variation in mortality and fertility will narrow, 
bringing about a progressive concentration at the lower levels of these variables. 
If the results of the projections are borne out, by the end of the century all the 
countries, except Bolivia and Haiti., :will-have à life expectancy at birth of over 
65 years and a total fertility rate of over 5. At the same time, the number, of 
countries with a life expectancy at birth of over 60 years willvdouble from 4 :to 
8 and the number of countries which have a total fertility rate under 3 will 
increase from three to ten. 
This evolution in the components of demographic; change will also produce 
significant variations inage distribution, as a reflection of the incipient aging 
process of the Latin American population. Between 1980 and the year 2000, the 
three broad age groups of the regional population will'grow more slowly than in 
the past decade, but at quite different rates (1.3% for young people, 2.6% for the 
working-age population and 3.2% for older people), which will result in a drop in 
thé proportion of young people from 39% to 34%, and an increase in the proportion 
of people of working age (from 57% to 62%) and of the aged (from 4% to 5%). In 
consequence, the dependency index will continue the downward trend begun in 1970 
and will reach 63% in-the year 2000, when the proportion of the aged in the. 
dependent population will have increased to 13%. In turn, the ratio between the 
working-age population arid the older population will continue to decline, reaching 
8 by the end of the century. In almost all of the countries the trends will be 
similar to those described here, but the magnitudes of the Changes will vary in 
direct relation"to the evolution of fertility. -
/4. Characteristics 
'-•• Characteristics aria trends of the spatial distribiifibii 
r- " of: the population 
Changes in the patterns of spatial distribution of the population 
Thé economic, social and political changés experienced by Latin America 
during the 1960s and 1970s havè^ had prbfòund effects on the patterns of the ' 
geographic distribution of -the population. These changes have occurred to 
different extents in the various countries of the region, heightening thé ; 
disparities among them as regards their modes of territorial occupation and 
urbanization. - '"•;" 
: ' Bètwéeri 'Ï960 arid 1980 the population1 density ;in Latin America rose from 10.5 
to 17.6 intiabitsiits per km2. 'This growth; Which was the product of the population 
iricrèaëè durfeg -thè period, provides too inexa'dt afi' indication of the greater 
intensity of'th® occupation of national territory. It is'df greater interest to 
note that ,rwh'ilë most of thè cóuntriés with higher densities in I960 -except Cuba 
and Haiti- had- igrowttì rates above the-'reg&nkl -rtean," "3n--'1980 the differéncë"s; had 
become'-sharpéî1 than they were twenty years before. Whër^àsthe South American 
countries have values which are close to the regional average, the indicators- for 
the other nations of the regions are higher than this mean and, are frequently 
twice aé highV' -Nevertheless, the Latih-'vAmer icàri population densities continue to 
be "relatively low ih à wórldwidé! ' córitéxt Ç "thè" ronly ttbUntriëë exhibit ihg; - > v • 
comparatively high Vàlués are El Salvador, Haiti iarid, to a lessèr extefot, thè 
Dominican "Republic."; ' "•• •••""• • -.•-.yv 
The gën'ërâl-iiàed' increase in density has hot been uniform; one contributing 
factor being thé concentration of the population in certain geographical areas in 
the countries of the région. It is estimated that arourid 1960, 33.5% of the total 
population was located in major administrative districts' whose density was 50 
inhabitants per km2 or above, and which covered scarcely 3.7% of--the territory. 
Twenty years later, the districts with this type of density constituted 7.8% of 
thé land; area of^Latin America, and more thkffrhalf of its population- (51.7%) 
resided there. ' Concurrently, there has beeti a-réduction of "empty"- spaces; whereas 
in! i960'nearly one-third (32.8%) of the land area in Latin America-had less than 
ohe itìtìkEatant per km2, in i980 only 7.7% of the territory had; such a "low density. 
^ Thé ̂ available data indicate that the spatial Concentration of- the Latin 
'American- pbpulët ion Continued in the 1960s and 1970s, èvén when it seetiis to have 
slowed,not" only1 because of a possible drop in thè growth of thé'total population, 
-biitf also because of the existénce of alternative locations in peripheral zones. 
Thus; an Argentina'an incipient reversal of the pattern of concentration in a 
cental nucleus has' Ijeen obsérved at the sane time as the share of the population 
in thè peripheral ¿ones is increasing; in Brazil the location patterns of the 
populationhave generally being maintained, although the peripheral zones have.also 
shown greater dynamism than the nucleus; in Mexico and Péru there seems to be no 
doubt that the concentrating effect continues to be felt; however, although this 
momentum has slackened in Peru due to the reinforcement of the peripheral areas, 
it has remained intense in Mexico. Another common denominator in the redistribution 
of the population in the countries studied relates to the striking decline of the 
/"central zones" 
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"central zones" which, generally, are settled areas of long standing in which 
agricultural and extractive activities are of great importance. 
There have also been significant changes during recent decades in the patterns 
of population distribution in countries having a smaller territory and population 
than those mentioned. In Honduras, the importance of the Caribbean coastline has 
been growing, especially the area along the Ulua-Aguan basin. In Ecuador, it has 
been observed that the mountainous provinces, which contained 58% of the country's 
inhabitants, were being surpassed by the rapid growth of the coastal areas in'the 
1960s and 1970s. In Paraguay, four departments (Amambay, Cariendiyu, the Upper 
Paranâ and Itapua), which possessed scarcely 8% of the national population in 1950, 
contained 30% in 1982. It would seem that the migratory movements associated with 
the settlement of the agricultural frontier and a more intensive exploitation of 
natural resources have unquestionably played an essential role in these latter 
changes. • . 
b) Urbanisation and urban concentration 
One of Latin America's distinctive traits is its relatively high degree of 
urbanization; the region has a much higher percentage of urban population than the 
other less developed regions* and exhibits a rapid evolution which, in this 
particular aspect, is similar to what has been occurring in the Soviet Union since 
the 1950s. In 1960 less than half of the regional population (49.6%) was considered 
as urban according to national definitions; twenty years later, the urban population 
clearly predominates, as is demonstrated by the fact that in 1980 it represented 
63.3% of the region's inhabitants. 
The greater growth of the urban population in relation to the total is the 
net result of the effects of natural growth and migration, and of the increasing 
number of urban sites. Since there is not enough detailed information to measure 
the independent effect of each one of the components, an indirect estimate has been 
carried out which, although very provisional in nature, shows that approximately 
two-thirds of the increase in the urban population of Latin America comes from 
natural growth (64% between 1960 and 1970, and 72% between 1970 and 1980) and that 
the combined contribution of migration arid "reclassification", corresponding to net 
rural-urban transfers, has decreased from 36% in the 1960s to 28% in the 1970s. It 
is this last component which, ultimately, explains the increase in the degree of 
urbanization in Latin America- hence,- this increase has been lessening over time. 
Concurrently , 'the growth of the urban population has also tended to dimiriish, in 
large part reflecting the drop in the natural growth of the countries' total 
population.8/ 
Despite What has been said as regards the decrease in the rate of growth in 
the 1970s, the urban population of the région more than doubled in the 1960-1980 
period, from approximately 104 million people to 223 million. The rural population 
increased by only 23 million during the same period, growing at a mean annual rate 
of about 1%. 
In some countries of the region, the Sluggish increase in rural areas has 
been expressed not only in the growth rate, but also in absolute decreases in the 
population of the countryside on a national and subnational scale during some 
/intercensal periods. 
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intercensal periods. On the other hand, since, this rural population is distributed 
among a large number of small settlements which are predominantly linked to 
agricultural activities, the population clearly depends upon the changes which 
this sector of activity undergoes as a result,.of the processes of modernization 
and of a breakdown of the peasant economy.. Many of these settlements are dispersed 
hamlets which exist under conditions of isolation and in which there is a lack of 
/attention to the basic needs of their inhabitants. Although the dimensions of the 
dispersion phenomenon have not been adequately established, it is likely that its 
incidence, is relatively high in areas of smallholdings and in. recently opened-up 
areas pf the agricultural frontier; the degreeof dispersion, certainly, will vary 
depending upon the proximity to larger localities.and communications routes. 
The: course followed by urbanization during the 1960s and 1970s presents some 
significant variations. In general, the more .highly, urbanized countries (Argentina, 
Uruguay, Chile and Cuba) exhibit lower rates of urban population growth (Venezuela 
would seem to be an exception to the mile); in contrast, the growth rates of the 
countries in which there is less urbanization (Haiti, Honduras » El Salvador, the 
Dominican Republic and Ecuador) are above the regional mean, approaching 5% 
annually. In general, it has been observed that, although the decrease in the rate 
of urban growth between 1970 and 1980 in relation to the 1960s.is shared by the 
region as a whole, the Central American countries, Mexico, Ecuador and Bolivia 
continue to experience higher rates than the, remaining countries. As a consequence 
of this pattern, the differences.among the countries as regards their degree of 
urbanization have tended to narrow. Thus, countries in which the urbanization 
process has been progressing over a longer period of time -Argentina, Uruguay, 
Chile and Cuba- tend to become grouped with others in which it has been more recent 
-Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Brazil- in a category of highly urbanized 
countries.Meanwhile, some Central American.;countries (Panama, Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica and El Salvador) and Andean countries (Bolivia and Ecuador), together with the 
' Dominican Republic, form an intermediate stratum in which 40%-56% of. the total 
population is classified as urban, In another four countries -Honduras, Paraguay, 
Guatemala and Haiti- there is a persistent rural majority. 
Despite the fact that the guidelines employed in the national definitions of 
urban population vary considerably, for the most part they identify localities, in 
which the inhabitants are not dispersed and in which some degree of diversification 
of economic .activities,tends to be produced. The increase in the. percentage of the 
population in this type of locality might therefore be interpreted as an ¡index of 
"de-ruralization". Furthermore, its rate of increase conforms to the change in 
the distribution of the labour force between the, country,- and the city. 10/ Using 
a stricter definition, the urban population is that which resides in\cities of 
20 000 inhabitants and over. The proportion of the total population in Latin 
America which meets this criterion rose;from 32.4%;in I960 to 147*3% in'1980; in 
absolute values, these indicators correspond to an increase from 53 million to 
128 million people in 20 years., The .sjẑ .jof.. this percentage ^nd the fact that it 
is on the rise reveal another facet.;iof.'rLatiii American .urbanization: its relative 
concentration. Thus, in 1960 nearly two-thirds (65.3%) of the population classified 
as urban lived in cities of 20 000 inhabitants and over; this percentage has 
increased over time.; reflecting:a h i g h e r , ' r a t e ¿,f annual increase, 11/ and reached 
almost three-fourths (.74.7%) in .1980* .Another indicator which may be used in the 
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evaluation of the features of this evolution during recent years is the percentage 
of total population growth which is absorbed by the urban centres of 20 000 
inhabitants, which rose from 63.9% in the 1960s to 73.7%.in the 1970s; i.e., 
between 1960 and 1980, two out of every three new inhabitants in the region Settled 
in cities. 
The situations, in the countries vary considerably from the mean values for 
the region. In 1960, four sets of countries could be identified and ranked 
according to the,proportion of their population in.cities of 20 000 inhabitants 
and over. In the. first group, composed of Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, more than 
half of the inhabitants lived in cities; the second group included those countries . 
in which at least one out of every three persons resided in such settlements 
(Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia and Panama); in the third group -Brazil, Mexico, Peru 
and Ecuador- residents.-in localities of 20 000 inhabitants, and over represented 
between one-fourth and, one-third of the total population. The remaining nine 
countries had very small city populations. .This picture changed substantially 
around 1980, when there were only four .countries in this last category (El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala and Haiti); and although in another two less than one-third of 
the population was liying in cities (Paraguay and Costa Rica), there were 14 
countries which had already exceeded this proportion. Although it is true that 
only five countries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguayj Venezuela and Colombia) surpassed 
the.50% mark, another three were very close to it (Cuba, Peru and Brazil); in the 
six remaining countries, between 34% and 43%;of the total population lived in 
localities of 20 000 inhabitants and over. . , 
Despite the fact that between 1960 and 1980 the relative portion of the total 
urban population residing in cities of 20 000 inhabitants and over increased in 
14 countries, remained constant in another six, and decreased somewhat only in one 
country, it does not appear valid to infer a single concentrating effect from these 
elements. It should be noted that an increase in the proportion of the urban 
inhabitants living in cities may be the result not only of -the greater size of some 
previously established centres which-grew more than the remaining urban areas, but 
also of an increase in the number of cities within, the country. This seems to be 
what has occurred in Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Paraguay, 
Nicaragua and Honduras -countries with a relatively low level of urbanization until 
the 1960s which had very,few localities of 20 000 inhabitants and over. The 
intensification of market relations and the establishment of distribution 
mechanisms have probably been major factors in the multiplication of the central 
nuclei of this size. However, this phenomenon was not only present in the less 
urbanized countries; it .also took place in Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Brazil. In 
Brazil, the number of settlements of 20 000 inhabitants and over Increased from 
96 to 482 between 1960 and 1980, and the territorial distribution during this 
period contributed to a lower spatial concentration of the urban population of 
this country.12/ A particular category of cities, defined as large cities 
(frequently the" leading city of a province or region), is composed of nuclei of 
100 000 inhabitants and over-, whose total number in Latin America was estimated at 
300 in 1980. In that year, these cities housed 128 million people, which was more 
than double their population in 1960, when they had 53 million inhabitants; their 
growth rate for the region as a whole was not significantly different from the 
rate for cities of 20 000 inhabitants and over,.although it was slightly lower 
than the latter rate in the 1970s.13/ Therefore, the degree of concentration of 
/the city 
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the city population in settlements of 100 000 inhabitants and over did not undergo 
any major change during those two decades. The regional value of the corresponding 
index rose from 78.1% to 78.9% in the 1960s, and dropped to 77 around,1980. .The 
proportion is, sufficiently high to confirm the existence of a concentrative'trait 
in the urbanization process of Latin America. With respect to the total urban ! 
population (national definitions), cities of 100 000 inhabitants and over exhibit 
a growing concentration, which increased from 51% to 57.5% between "I960 and 1980. 
As is true of the urban: population and of cities of 20 000 inhabitants,and 
over,: the growth rates of the large cities of 100 000 inhabitants and over have 
been declining over time and tend to be lower in countries which have achieved a . 
higher degree of urbanization. 14/., ; k 
The increasing scale of the concentration of the urban population has led to 
the emergence of cities of over one million inhabitants (metropolises). The 
recentness of the metropolitan phenomenon is demonstrated, by"the fact'that at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, there was not a single metropolis in Latin 
America; by about 1960 this phenomenon had occurred: in nihe:countries. (Argentina 
and Brazil, with three cities, with over one million; Cuba;, Chile, Mexico, Colombia; 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela ), repre sent-ing 2 9 i 8 % of, the : region ' s urban populat ion. 
It is estimated' that in 1980 there were 26 metropolises -in 12,countries (Ecuador, 
the Dominican Republic and Guatemala had joined.the list; Brazil had nine; Colombia 
had another four; Mexico had three and Argentina, two),.with 45%-of the urban 
population. Between 1960 and 1980 the metropolitan population.of,the regioni had 
risen from 31 million to 100 million; in other words, out of the total number of 
inhabitants in the region, the metropolises accounted for. 14.8% in 1960 and 28.5% 
in 1980. The growth rate of the metropolitan population was much more rapid than 
for the other two. categories of cities, and reached a rate of 5.9% for the twenty-
year period, with a slightly slower rate of increase during the 1970s.15/ 
It has often been asserted,that the urban systems of the Latin American 
countries are notable for their high degree of primacy; i.e., for the unquestionable 
predominance of. some large city, usually the political -administrative capital of 
each nation.16/ It is thought that this characteristic is the result of the 
combined action of demographic, social and economic processes occurring in societies 
which are heavily centralized both politically and economically•and which have 
historically developed under conditions, of external dependence. Both the . 
consolidation of the primary-exporter model and the import substitution effort 
seem to have helped to maintain and reinforce the pre-eminence of the main city, 
as a general rule, in the countries of the region.17/ This primacy appeared to 
increase until the 1950s, emerging in countries of different level? of development 
and different demographic and territorial sizes. The data concerning the population 
in the cities of nine Latin American countries in 1960-1980,cast doubt upon-the 
universal and increasing nature of this phenomenon.18/ 
Two. countries which exhibited a .high index of primacyuivt.il^'he1950s 
-Argentina and Cuba- experienced a- sustained downward trend.in this regard which 
became particularly evident in the 1970s, and which; was more pronounced in Cuba. -
This held true for the relationship among the 4 largest cities and also among the 
11 largest, and involved the relative growth of the medium-sized-cities. This 
index is supported by the fact that the proportions of the city population of 
/100 000 inhabitants 
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100 000 inhabitants and over and of 20 000 inhabitants and over corresponding to 
Buenos Aires and Havana showed a decreasing rate. Another novel fact is.that in 
both cases the predominant city grew at a slower rate than the countries' urban 
population and than their total population during the 1970s.19/ 
In Peru the relative predominance of the capital city has declined during 
the last two intercensal periods (1961-1972 and 1972-1981); this ië confirmed by 
the relationship between the largest city and the three next largest cities, as - : 
well as between the former:and the ten next largest cities. This loss df primacy' 
appeared to be due to the growth of the second-largest city in the Peruvian urban 
system; furthermore, the ; drop in the percentage accounted for by Lima of the 
population in cities of 20 000 inhabitants and over is a reflection of the combined 
effect of the Increased density of the basic urban network (the number of cities 
of that size rose from 26 to 48 between 1961 and 1981) and of the higher growth 
rate in medium-sized cities,. As in Peru, a reduction was also observed in Paraguay, 
as regards the predominance of the capital city over the rest of the urban network 
which, in this case, was very limited. Until the 1960s, Asuncion was the only 
centre of 20 000 inhabitants or more; later, other centres of this size, emerged 
and the percentage of the urban population increased; both elements brought about 
a decrease in the indices of primacy between 1972 and 1982. 
Only three of the countries studied exhibited clear indications that the 
primacy of the capital was becoming greater. In Chile, there was a sustained 
increase in primacy vis-à-vis four cities until 1970, but in the following decade, 
the figure remained stationary. The index relating to 11 cities declined. These 
facts, combined with the decrease in Santiago's relative share of the city 
population (20 000 inhabitants and over), although not of the urban population, 
suggest that the relative size of medium and smaller nuclei might be increasing, 
at the same time that the. position of the smaller centres (under 20 000 inhabitants) 
may be becoming weaker. In Panama the index of primacy, of the nation's capital 
fell in relation to the three next largest cities during the 1960s, but experienced 
a sharp upturn in the following decade; the increase is less pronounced if the 
11 largest urban centres.are taken into consideration, which may suggest growth.at 
the intermediate levels of the urban pyramid.20/ It is probable that the only clear 
example among the nine countries studied of an increase in the predominance of the 
largest city during the 1970s was the Dominican Republic, where the indices of 
primacy and the percentages of the urban and total population corresponding to the 
capital increased. The only value which decreased, and this was only slightly, 
was the percentage represented by the population of Santo Domingo in comparison to. 
the other cities of 20 000 inhabitants and over, due to the increase in the number 
of centres of that size. ' 
Brazil and Ecuador are countries in which the pattern of urban hierarchy is 
uncommon for Latin America, in that the major city is not notably predominant.21/ 
In Ecuador the index showing the relationship with the four most populous cities 
remained practically unchanged between 1962 and 1982. The index for 11 cities 
declined slightly between 1962 and 1974 and did not vary between 1964 and 1982; 
the latter index showed a similar behaviour when the two largest cities were 
included in its numerator. Other indicators also demonstrate that the urban 
network has expanded especially in the 1960s and 1970s. In comparative terms, 
Brazil exhibits a lower degree of .iirban primacy.. Although the index for four 
/cities increased 
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cities increased slightly between 1960 and 1980 as a result of the greater share 
of the population in Sao Paulo after it displaced Rio de Janeiro as the most 
populous centre in the .country , when the sum of both metropolitan areas is related 
to the nine next largest centres, it càn be sëen that there has bèen a consistent 
declinç in primacy ever since the 1950s, Thus, the low degree.of primacy,in the 
Brazilian urbán system is tending to decline, and.the distribution of urban size 
would appear ito be assuming a less concentrated nature, as illustrated by the 
decreasing percentages of the urban population and of the city population (of 
20 000 inhabitants aftd over) corresponding to the tMp"'iiajpr jofetropolitan .areas. 
c) Occupation of space and concentration of.the population . 7 
In summary, the spatial redistribution proçeès in the Latin Àmëriçàn 
population, hastened by the different behaviours of fertility ând mortality and by 
geographic mobility, led to an expansion of occupied space and an increase in the 
degree of concentration of the population in the 1960s and 1970s. Togéther with 
the horizontal expansion involved iri the settlement of territories which were 
previously sparsely inhabited, Latin America has experienced aft intensification 
of the vertical occupation of space, which is represented by high-density zones. 
Despite the fact that the two phenomena appëar to be headed in different directions, 
their simultaneous occurrence causes them to be juxtaposed. Strictly speaking, 
much of thè horizontal expansion linked totlieextension of the countries' internal 
frontiers" is taking place in conjunctiort' with' the efnergence and development of 
urban centres. ' . 
The areas in which population growth has been greater than the mean national 
values are generally the nuclei of metropolitan concentration and the peripheral 
zones, where a major increase in the urban proportion has also been observed. 
Furthermore, in a number of countries, large portions of the central zones with 
long-standing settlements aré shrinking in population in relátive terms; 
fundamentally, this situation appears to' be accounted for by the "breakdown" of 
the peasant economy and by the introduction of forms of entrepreneurial 
organization in agricultural production which tend to substitute seasonal manpower 
for a stable labòur force. 
Thus.the form.of settlement towards which most of the Latin American 
population7tends is the urban type. The urbanization process of the Latin American 
society and economy involves a certain degree of concentration of members of the 
work force in a few relatively large cities. Nevertheless, the rate at which the 
demographic expression oí this process is expanding itóuld Seem to be diminishing, 
as suggested by the declining growth rates of individual cities vis-à-vis the 
national averages. It has also been observed that, despite the increase in the 
relative importance of nuclei of 20 0ÒÓ inhabitants"and over -which suggests the 
existence of highly concentrated urban systems- both the concentration of the city 
population in localities of 100 000 inhabitants and over and the indices of primacy 
relating to the predominance of the population Volume ; of the largest urban nuclei 
point to a slackening in the impetus óf Concentration, its ëventual cessation and, 
in some cases, its possible reversal. Concurrently, à diffusion of urban sites 
has been observed, especially of cities of 20 0Ò0 inhabitants and over, in "' 
countries with large populations and territories (such as Brazil and Peru),as well 
as in other smaller countries (such as the Dominican Republic and Ecuador). This 
/increase in 
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increase in the number of urban centres, combined with the growth of the previously 
existing nuclei, has contributed to the expansion of the countries' urban networks. 
Finally, the large cities or. metropolises have also been changing their 
configuration, with the appearance of vast suburban.and satellite areas which 
continuously interact with the central nuclei. 
5. Economic and social development 
The demographic trends discussed above have been accompanied by relatively rapid 
economic growth and important social changes,22/ A brief description is given 
below of some of the most outstanding characteristics of these processes as regards 
recent trends and projections of demographic change. . 
After the, Second World War and until the mid-1970s, the trend prevailing in 
the region's economy was reflected in an increasingly rapid growth of the gross 
domestic product, which reached a rate of over 7% during the 1970-1975 period. 
Although great differences existed among the countries., the changes over time in 
the regional context were the result of a progressive concentration at the higher 
growth levels. This trend was abruptly reversed in the second half of the 1970s, 
when the growth rate dropped to slightly over 5% and then continued to decline 
until it reached a rate of -1% in 1982. Thus, for the first time since 1959, the 
per capita gross domestic product decreased -by 1% in 1981 and by more than 3% in 
1982. 
The high rates of economic growth which prevailed until the mid-1970s were 
accompanied by profound changes in the productive structure. The manufacturing 
industry grew even more rapidly than the gross domestic product, in that its 
contribution to that product rose from 18% to 24% between 1950 and 1975. The 
increase in.this share occurred in all the countries, but was more pronounced in 
countries with larger economies, and populations, which were already at .a higher 
level of, industrialization in 1950. During this time, there was an opposite trend 
in the agricultural sector, whose contribution to the gross domestic product fell 
from 20% to 13%. This sector's growth rate declined to such an extent that in 
many countries, domestic demand had to be met partly by imports. During the second 
half of the 1970s, the above trends in the contributions of the agricultural and 
industrial sectors to the gross domestic product continued, although with less 
dynamism, thereby presaging the reversal of these trends which was to come about 
later. In 1980 and 1982, the contribution of the agricultural sector once again 
grew slightly in the region as a whole and in more than half of the countries, at 
the same time that industry's contribution declined significantly in the region 
and in almost all of the countries. 
The rapid growth of the economy corresponded to a similar'trend in investment, 
which reached annual growth rates of over 8% between 1965 and 1973. Beginning in 
the mid-1960s, the investment-product coefficient for the region as a whole 
remained above 20%, reaching approximately 23% in 1970-1974 and over 24% in the 
following five-year period. However, investment varied widely from country to 
country, and generally was higher and more stable in the large and medium-sized 
nations. Since 1980, this coefficient has decreased in the large majority of the 
countries, dropping to 21% for the region as a whole in 1982. 
/The rapid 
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The rapid growth of investment in the region was supported by high levels of 
domestic savings,>which exceeded 18% of the gross domestiò product beginning in 
1950, reaching more than 21%. in 1974-1975, and later fell to;Slightly oyer. 18% in 
1982. In the region as ; a whole., this meant that the proportion of invèètmètìt- ": 
financed with domestic savings was over 90% in all periods between 1950 and-' 
1975-1979; since that time it has remained low and was slightly over 87% in 1982. 
Nevertheless, the figure varied greatly from, one-country to another, and was 
generally greater in countries with higher and more stable levels of investment. 
Despite the high growth rates, however, the productive system lias not bëèn 
able to create à sufficient number of jobs to absorb a'labour force which was 
growing rapidly due, in large part, to the high rate of population growth. The-
under-utilization of manpower is a persistent problem in the region. According 
to PREALC */ the rate of totalUnder-utilization (equivalent -unemployment plus 
open unemployment) has been declining very slowly, from 23% to 20% between 1950 
and 1980, with the result that in 1980 there was an equivalent of 23 million 
unemployed. This is mainly due to underemployment since; except in exceptional 
cases, the rates of open.unemployment did not exceed 4%. In 1980, despite the 
decline in its relative magnitude,.underemployment still accounted for 80% of 
the total under-utilization of manpower. 
Within the region, the rate of under-utilization varied a great deal from • 
country to country. In 1980 it was only 4% in Argentina, whereas in Bolivia it 
was over 40%. The trends of change are also different, and both levels and trends 
are related to such factors as the degree'of development, urbanization; the 
dynamism of the economy and population growth.. . : . . 
Given thé relative autonomy of the socialprocess with respect to what occurs 
at,the material base of the society, it now bécomes necessary to examine the degree 
of diffusion in the society of this economic growth; this is not so much for 
reasons of equality, but rather because of its repercussions on population dynamics. 
Only a few indicators which are most directly related to the possible changes in 
the population have been chosen for this.synthesis of social development. In view 
of the various social groups' unequal contributions to the growth of the 
population, it is interesting to examine the structural roots which are behind 
the composition of these societal groups.: 
The appraisals made in a number of ECLA documents "speak of a basic 
ambivalence in the development of recent years; this involves a development which, 
"while on the one hand it revealed:the region's capacity for increasing its 
material output at a fairly high rate, on the other it reflected a flagrant 
inability to distribute fairly the results of this more rapid material progress".23/ 
However, these deficiencies have;had different, outcomes in'the various areas 
which compose social development. - • . . • . 
The indicators on'income distribution, with its implication of extreme 
poverty for a part of the^population, are those which best reflect the 
contradiction between the material progress and social progress in the countries 
••:/ PREALC: "Dinàmica del subempieo en America Latina". Estudios e Informes 
de la CEPAL, No. 10 (E/CEPAL/G.1183), August 1981. 
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of the region. Estimates made by ECLA in 1975 based on data from seven countries, 
which together represent almost 80% of the population and slightly over;90% of the 
gross domestic product of Latin America, indicate that 10% of the richest 
households received 47.3% of total income, whereas the poorest 40% received only 
7.7% of that income. 
The most serious aspect of this inequality is its persistence. The above 
estimates not only confirm this persistence,, but also show that even after 15 years 
of unprecedented economic progress, the situation of the poorest people is, 
comparatively, worse than at the beginning of the period. Moreover, this relative 
insufficiency is accompanied by a poverty which is now defined in absolute terms 
(insufficiency as regards the satisfaction of basic needs). 
Estimates prepared around 1970 indicate that there were approximately 110 
million poor people in the region and that of this number, 54 million were indigent. 
The former figure represented 40% of the total population of ten Latin American 
countries (which, in turn, included 84% of the total population of Latin America)-, 
that percentage was an average of considerable differences among areas of residence, 
since 62% of the rural population in those ten countries lived under conditions of 
absolute poverty. This is, of course, an average of the different percentages in 
each country. 
The situation prevailing around 1970 may have varied during the course of 
the decade. In fact, estimates made by ECLA in 1975 indicated that, despite the 
deteriorating position of the poorest groups as regards income distribution in 
relative terms, there had been an increase in these groups' income in absolute 
terms. The income per household of the poorest. 40% was US$ 520 in 1960, whereas in 
1975 it was US$ 648 (both in 1970 dollars). . Additional information is. needed in 
order to establish the significance of this increase in absolute terms, how it 
affects the percentage of people below the extreme poverty line and the extent to 
which these percentages vary from country to country. For that purpose, in 
addition to data on the increase of income, it is necessary to determine the 
increases in the costs of the satisfaction of basic needs, as well as the extent 
to which the proportion of extremé poverty is influenced by population movements 
from rural aréas to urban zones. 
Other indicators selected for this partial summary of social development give 
a relatively different picture from what is indicated by the patterns of income 
distribution in Latin America. This is particularly evident in the composition of 
the labour force by productive sectors, as well as in.the trends of educational 
achievements. 
The data prepared by PREALC 24/ on changes' in the distribution of the labour 
force among the various branches oF~economic activity indicate that there has been a 
steady decline in the labour force employed in agriculture, together with an 
increase in the services sector for all the countries of the region included in the 
analysis. The èxódus of manpower from a sector which has been characterized by 
the highest percentages of the population in a state of extreme poverty seems to 
point in the direction òf improved livelihood opportunities. In the cases where 
the services sector is linked to the dynamics of the productive process, thè 
increase of the labour force within the sector will entail a real improvement in 
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the position of that population in society; when the increase is primarily due to 
the entry of people who are unemployed, in the productive apparatus who create their 
own jobs by offering personal .arid generally non-productive services, there will be 
a social change toward greater:iurbanization involving a movement from the primary 
branches to services, but the poverty levels will continue to be relatively similar. 
The labour force employed in industry 'is also "• growing in relative terms in 
almost all the countries as a concomitant of the urbanization process, the decline 
in the agricultural labour force and the growth of the services sector. The extent 
of the relative growth of the industrial labour force appears to be related to the 
previous level of industrialization. The countries in which the proportion of the 
economically-active population employed in industry is relatively smaller are the 
countries in which the growth of that labour force is proportionally greater. 
The Dominican Republic is the most striking case, with an increase from 8.6% in 
1960 to 20.3% in 1980. Honduras had the next largest increase, registering 8.2% 
in 1960 and 14.7% in 1980. In Panama, where the proportion of the economically-
active population employed in industry is also low, it grew from 7.6% in 1960 to 
10.8% in 1980. ' 
The countries which had the highest percentages of their economically-active 
population in industry were the countries in which these proportions increased the 
least: in Argentina, which is the most extreme case, there was a decrease from 
27.1% to 21%, while Chile and Uruguay exhibited barely perceptible increases. 
There were some exceptions: in El Salvador, where there was a low percentage 
of the economically-active population in industry in 1960 (12.2%)j this proportion 
nevertheless decreased to 10.8% in 1980; Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru 
are some of thei countries which' had a relatively low proportion of the economically-
active population in the industrial sector in 1960 and which experienced very 
slight increases in this aspect of the distribution of their labour force. 
In any event , these trends should not' be allowed to obscure the overall 
distribution of the economically-active population among the productive sectors of 
the different countries. Despite the vast, changes observed, in 1980 more than 50% 
of the economically-active population was engaged in agriculture in the following 
countries: Bolivia (56.1%), Ecuador (51.6%), El Salvador (52.4%), Guatemala (55.4%) 
and Honduras (56.9%). 
Information about the present situation and the progress made in education 
is provided by data from the Organization of American States (OAS),25/ and ECLA : 
publications 26/ based on data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The OAS data demonstrate that all the countries 
have experienced a significant decline in the proportion of illiterates; out of 
the 25 countries considered, 15 had an illiteracy levelofmorethan 30%, 
approximately, in 1950; however, in 1980, only 8 of the total of 25 countries 
continued to be in this situation. The magnitude of this educational problem in 
the region should not be underestimated, however, since there is still a large 
number of countries with illiteracy percentages higher than what would be expected 
in the late twentieth century. 
The trend in the future, after 1980, may improve in view of what is indicated 
by the UNESCO data prepared by ECLA for 1980 with respect to school enrollment 
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of children between 6 and 11 years of age. In Guatemala and Haiti, where 32% and 
33.6%, respectively., of the children were enrolled in school in 1960, these 
percentages were 53.3% and 41;1%, respectively. Considering the children between : 
6 and 11 years of age as a group for the entire region, school enrollment increased 
from 57.3% in 1960 to 82.3% in 1980. • • -
These educational changes will not only be felt in elementary education but 
will also become evident at higher levels of formal education. The data cited 
show that school enrollment between 12 and 17 years of age climbed from 35.4% in 
1960 to 63.3% in 1980 for the countries of the region as a whole; at the highest 
level this change is even greater, as the enrollment proportion for students from 
18 to 23. years of age quadrupled for the region as a whole, rising from 6.3% to 
26.1% between 1960 and 1980. Although it is true that the 12-17 age group may 
include young people who are repeating the elementary level, thereby partially 
distorting what would appear to be enrollment, in secondary education, there is no 
doubt that there has been, significant progress. The same may be said of the 
increase in university enrollment. 
Other indicators used to measure the extent of societal diffusion of the 
fruits of development indicate that the proportion of. thé population in.each of 
the Latin American countries which is, slowly or rap idly,..beginning to'" enjoy the 
benefits of its growth has been increasing. This is confirmed :by the data on the 
consumption of electricity, and can also be plausibly extrapolated from the 
increases in the consumption of calories and proteins, as well as the decline in 
the number of inhabitants per doctor. 
The information already presented on various dimensions of social development-
indicate, in general, significant progress during.the past 20 or 30 years in each 
and every one of these dimensions, and is undeniable evidence that major social 
changes have occurred in the Latin American'region. However, this same information 
shows that there is still a long way to go, particularly in some.of the relatively 
least advanced countries, if the Latin American population as a whole is actually 
to enjoy the social benefits made possible by the economic progress achieved. 
6. Development and demographic variables 
The above summary of the most outstanding aspects of the demographic change and of 
economic and social development illustrates the .wide variety of situations and 
trends present in the region's countries with regard to some of the most important 
dimensions of these complex processes. Such a description is merely the first step 
necessary to identify the principal relationships between development and 
demographic variables. 
If only the variables at the most aggregated level are considered, ii.e. ¿ the 
fertility, mortality and urbanization of the countries' populations and a synthetic 
indicator of the degree of economic development, it is evident that, in general, 
there is a quite well-defined relationship among all these elements. Thè historical 
experience which is the basis for what has been called the theory of demographic 
transition indicates that, as countries have developed and urbanized, mortality 
and fertility have declined, although the pattern of these changes and their 
determinants vary widely according to the region and country. 
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In some Latin American countries, this process has been advancing ever since 
the beginning of the century. In others, the decreases -first in mortality and 
subsequently in fertility- began at a later point. As a resuit of these trends, 
the countries of the region are curreiitiy at differènt states in the process of 
demographic transition. Some, such as Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama 
and Uruguay, which are furthest along in the transition, currently have total 
fertility rates of le'éìè than 3.5 and life expectancies at birth of 70 years or more. 
At the other extreme, Bolivia and Haiti have total fertility rates of about 6 and 
life expectancies at birth under 54 years. 
If the degree of development (measuréd by a synthetic' index such as the per 
capita GDP) is compared with the total fertility rates and life expectancies at 
birth observed in the region in 1980, it is; found that there is generally an inverse 
relationship between'the levels of fertility and mortality and the degree, of 
development. It can also be seen that the degree of urbanization (the percentage 
of urban population according to national definitions) and development; are 
positively related. However, even a very brief examination of figure 1 will show 
that the degree of development only partially explains, the variations in fertility, 
mortality and urbanization among the Countries. In addition, and more importantly, 
the high level of aggregation at which these comparisons are made does not allow 
an extrapolation of causal relationships between specific variables which might be 
useful in policy formulation.' . ' 
The wide variety of situations and trends as regards the economic, social and 
demographic variables in the countries of the region has already been noted. It is 
a proven fact that the indicators of these variables for each country are the 
result of very heterogenous behaviour in different sectors of the economy, different 
regions and in thè groups and social strata which make up the national population. 
It is precisely the different national configurations of this structural 
heterogeneity which make it possible to sèt forth some hypotheses to explain the 
variations in thé indices of fertility and mortality and the degree of 
urbanization. However, the information is not available which would be needed in 
order to calculate the changes at the national level as a weighted average of the 
changes in different social strata or spatially-defined groups of the population. 
The only means of formulating some hypotheses about the factors which have caused 
the recent demographic change arid some of the Consequences of this change for 
economic and social development is through the verification of the existence of 
behavioural differences /based on some socio-economic characteristics of people or, 
households as regards changes in the social structure and changes in some indicators 
of economic and social development which are thought to be associated with levels 
of fertility and mortality and the degree of urbanization. Taking this viewpoint 
into account, the following chapters present some elements of the analysis of the 
factors causing demographic change and the implications pf' this change for the 
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II. ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ITS USE IN 
FORMULATING POLICIES 
1. Economic, social and cultural determination 
The results of research conducted in recent years on some factors associated with 
demographic change demonstrate two important facts: a) the existence of differences 
in fertility and mortality according to urban or rural area of residence, according 
to societal group membership and according to the educational level of the couple; 
b) the difficulty of using these results in order to formulate public policies, 
inasmuch as the causes of population phenomena have not been sufficiently explained, 
and that makes it hard to orient public action on appropriate lines. These two 
facts bring out the need for a new working approach in the field of socio-
demographic research, in which, without shelving the type of descriptive studies 
which has been in vogue, the basic concern will be to obtain and present results 
that can be used in the formulation of official population policies. This calls 
for an approach which considers demographic change in relation both to the 
economic and to the social and cultural aspects of the countries' development. 
Most of the studies on fertility and mortality take these as phenomena 
occurring in certain geographical areas or certain social groups, pointing to the 
differences in those areas or between those groups as more or less direct, and 
sometimes automatic, consequences of economic and social situations. This concept, 
which is basically sound in respect of mortality, must be revised in relation to 
fertility. In this latter case, there is a psycho-social element, conditioned 
by the cultural characteristics of the various countries, which particularly 
influences the decision of couples in connection with the consequences of their 
sex relations: birth or contraception. 
If national societies with different levels and styles of development show 
widely differing avarage fertility rates, and if the same thing happens among 
various social groups, the motivation of couples should be related to certain 
basic characteristics of those societies and those social groups. Years ago, 
when ideas on demographic transition were in their infancy, Notestein wrote that 
rural societies in Europe, and almost throughout the world, were organized in 
such a way as to exert strong pressure on their members in favour of reproduction. 
And he went on to add that the new ideal of the small family typically emerged 
in urban industrial society.27/ Since then, several theoretical lines of thought 
have attempted to account for the differences between the motivations of social 
groups as regards family size. 
Among these, it is the "modernization theory" that makes the study of 
motivation most explicit, in so far as it centres its explanation on categories 
proper to the cultural level of analysis. Concepts such as "level of aspirations", 
"openness to change", "occupational mobility", "upward social mobility", etc., 
are those used to characterize the "modern" personality structure which finds 
egression in the attitudes and behaviour of this type of social actor. Given 
the value attached to the latter, the study of fertility in this current of theory 
/is concentrated 
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is concentrated on the groups that have a relatively small number of children; 
the behaviour of the social group with a large number of children, in contrast, 
is somewhat residually explained® 
Unlike the preceding line of thoughts the historical-structural current 
takes into account the elements relating to production on which the formation of 
social groups is -based9 since it would be the characteristics of their position 
in this socioeconomic set-up that would lead certain social groups to aim at a 
high rate.of fertility. According to this view, it is the poorest groups, 
marginalized or inadequately incorporated in the structure of production, 
that have to try out survival strategies to provide themselves with what, 
they cannot obtain through the formal labour market; among these strategic moves 
would be the building-up of a large family, to supply them with*plenty of earners 
of goods or money, who will jointly bring in an income sufficient for the family 
to live on„ Writers taking this line devote their attention essentially to the 
study of the anomalies of the capitalist system, and consequently their concern 
for this poorest group leads them to neglect analysis of the reproductive behaviour 
of the middle and upper strata, 
A new theoretical approach, which focuses its explanation on the different . 
economic value represented by children for the different social groups, relates 
motivation towards a specific family size with purely economic factors, which 
would be very rationally evaluated by couples before deciding in favour of birth 
or contraception.. The strict logic of this theoretical approach, however, allows, 
for no explanation of the reproductive behaviour-of social groups which continue 
to produce a large number of children, despite the fact that, according to the 
theoretical premises, they ought to have decided in favour of a smaller family 
size® In such cases, some writers following this line of thought fall back on 
cultural exceptions, which can be used to explain everything that is not in keeping 
with economic predictions? the groups concerned, it would seem, formerly had a 
productive situation adjusted to a large family size, but, although changes have 
occurred in those circumstances, have not changed their cultural patterns, and 
are thus led to persist in forms of reproductive behaviour that are no longer 
appropriate. 
From the findings of all this research a few basic conclusions can be drawn. 
The first of these is that the reproductive Behaviour of social groups is 
associated with different motivations which incline them towards a large or small 
family size, while consideration must also be given to the possibility that some 
social groups only marginally incorporated into the development process have no 
motivation whatsoever as regards the ideal number of children, a fact which 
"naturally" results in a relatively larger family size. 
The second conclusion indicates that the influence of the social structure 
on the various motivations of social groups does not derive from any single one 
of its structural dimensions, but stems from a historically conditioned global 
structuration which is based on economic aspects connected with production, on 
others relating to the social distribution of the benefits of development, and on. 
certain cultural components, linked to value judgements and/or ideologies, which 
through customs and standards of conduct influence behaviour. 
/A third 
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A third conclusion is that the influence of the social structure is not 
exercised directly on each couple, but through the formation of general cultural 
patterns-which exert pressure-on people without their being aware of it. When 
certain relations between fertility and urban or rural areas, and between 
fertility and educational levels, are analysed, it will be seen how cultural 
features that characterize the area of residence as a whole conation the repro-
ductive behaviour of couples, partially modifying what might be expected from 
their individual characteristics. These cultural features themselves: will be 
linked with the production and distribution structure of the area of residence 
in question. 
. As regards mortality, . it must be stressed that the réduction of the !jriiortality 
rate is an undisputed objective of development, so much so that life expectancy 
at birth is considered to be the best synthetic index for evaluating the success 
achieved in the development process. In the theoretical approaches there is also 
a consensus to the effect that, as an independent variable, the biological element 
plays a very secondary role in the determination of the variations observed in 
mortality among people pertaining to different social groins, and that these 
variations result from the particular incidence of specific causes of death in 
the economic, social and cultural environment in which they occur. 
Material living conditions, resulting from low and unsteady income levels 
which are reflected in unsatisfactory nutritional, hygienic and housing conditions, 
figure among the main causes of death. The high rate of mortality at early ages 
in the extreme-poverty groups has empirically confirmed this interpretation. 
All this makes the relation between economic and social development 
characteristics and the level of mortality intelligible. Generally speaking, 
there is a direct relationship between the level in question and the degree of 
economic development of a society, but the patterns followed by the development 
process, especially as regards participation of the population in the labour 
force, will imply that a larger or smaller proportion of the population is living 
in the worst material conditions, and this in turn will be reflected in a higher 
or lower mortality rate for society as a whole. 
In this sense, the persistence of poverty in broad population sectors is 
an important factor in accounting for the mortality rate's declining so slowly 
in comparison with what was expected in many countries of the region during the 
last decade. 
2. Contributions and limits of description of change 
Research makes an effective contribution to thé supply of inputs .for policy formu-
lation when, besides describing^population phenomena as exhaustively âs possible, 
breaking down behaviour .patterns by area and by social group, it endeavours to 
seize upon the determining factors that have a causal relation with population 
trends and their variations. 
As part of the contributions made in the form of description of demographic 
change, the most recent findings stemming from a source of information that covers 
/various countries 
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various countries of the region are presented below. The data given in tables 1, 
2 and 3» prepared on the basis of results of the World Fertility Survey, show 
once again that in the more urbanized areas fertility is lower in the less urban 
and rural areas; that groups in the upper social strata have a considerably 
smaller number of children than the poorer groups; and that fertility is lower 
among women with higher levels of education than in those with less than a year 
of formal schooling, or none at all. Furthermore, the data presented in tables 4 
and 5 indicate the same general relations between these socio-economic variables 
and mortality in the early year's of life: i.e., urban areas, women with a higher 
level of education and the upper income groups show a lower rate of mortality 
than is found in rural areas, among women with low levels of education and in the 
poorest groups.28/ 
Other socio-economic indicators traditionally used to describe differences 
in demographic variables are the economic activity status of women, and membership 
of ethnical groups with special socio-cultural characteristics, such as indigenous 
communities. The first of these two indicators, relating to the activity status 
of women, has also been used by CELADE on the basis of data from the World 
Fertility Survey, with the results observable in table 6. Despite the innovations 
introduced to quantify the proportion of time worked during the period of union 
of the couple, with the aim of more meticulously analysing the potential 
incompatibility between working and bearing children, the results are neither as 
clear nor as systematic as those noted in respect of the other socio-economic 
indicators. This may be due to the diversity of motives for which women go out 
to work; in the poor groups, women usually do so under the pressure of economic 
anxieties, while in the middle and upper income groups they do so as a vocational 
fulfilment made possible by better levels of education. 
However, the substantial contributions made from the standpoint of description 
must not be allowed to conceal some significant limitations in terms of policy 
inputs. Given a gradual delinkage between the indicators used as variables and 
the social phenomena which through these indicators it is attempted to grasp, two 
facts emerge which must be weighed with caution. One of these will be presented 
below, and relates to the differences between fertility levels that may be found 
in association with the same indicator and with the same value of the said indicator. 
The other is the necessity of rediscovering that significance of the. phenomenon to 
which the indicator does not refer; it will be the subject of section 3 which 
follows. 
Residence in the country's metropolitan area may signify an average fertility 
of 2.94 children per woman in Paraguay or one of 3.80 children per woman in Peru 
(see table 1), whereas in the metropolitan area of Argentina, the average 
may be 1.4-9 children per woman.29/ 
It can be observed within one and the same country (Brazil) that a town 
with approximately 40 000 inhabitants can show an average fertility rate similar 
to that of a city with_several million inhabitants (3.3 children per woman in 
Americana and 3.1 in Sao Paulo), and, in contrast, quite different from the rate 
in another town of approximately the same size (4.8 children per woman in Pouso 
Alegre). The difference in fertility between the two small cities is grounded on 
the industrial character of the first, a feature which it shares with Sao Paulo, 
notwithstanding the great disparity in size.30/ 
/Table 1 
Table 1 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO WOMEN BETWEEN 20 AND 49 YEARS OF AGE WHO HAVE EVER ENGAGED IN A 
UNION, BY AREA OF RESIDENCE, STANDARDIZED BY DURATION OF UNION 
Area of residence Colombia Costa Rica Mexico a/ Panama Paraguay Peru Venezuela a/ 
Metropolitan area 3.5 3.5 4.0 b/ 3.5 2.9 3.8 3.1 c/ 
Large cities 4.0 - 4.2 - - 4.3 — 
Other urban areas 4.7 4.0 4.7 4.0 3.8 4.9 3.9 
Rural area 5.2 5.1 4.8 4.7 4.8 5.0 4.8 
Table 2 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO WOMEN BETWEEN 20 AND 49 YEARS OF AGE, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION, 
STANDARDIZED BY DURATION OF UNION 
Years of study completed Colombia Costa Rica Mexico a/ Panama Paraguay Peru Venezuela a/ 
None 5.3 5.9 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.1 4.8 
1 to 3 years 5.0 5.1 4.7 d/ 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.3 d/ 
4 or more years of primary education 4,3 4.3 . 4.2 e/ 4.3 3.8 4.3 3.5 e/ 
Secondary and higher education 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.2 2.7 3.3 2.8 
Table 3 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO WOMEN BETWEEN 20 NAD 49 YEARS OF AGE, BY OCCUPATION OF 
HUSBAND, STANDARDIZED BY DURATION OF UNION 
Occupation of husband Colombia . Costa Rica Mexico a/ Panama Paraguay Peru 
Agricultural: wage-earner 5.2 ". 5.2 ' 4.8 4.9 4.7 5.2 
Agricultural: employer or own—account worker 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.7 . 5.0 5.0 
Non-agricultural: unskilled manual worker 4.8 4.7 4.2 4.6 4.2 4.9 
Non-agricultural: skilled manual worker 4.3 4.3 4.6 : 4.:1 3.7 4.4 
Non-agricultural: non-manual, low. and 
3l4 medium level 4.0 3.6 4.1 3.0 4.1 
Non-agricultural: non-manual, high level 3.5 3.2 3,6 3.1 2.8 3.4 
Source : Calculations by CELADE on the basis of data from the World Fertility Survey. 
a/ . Corresponds to women between 15 and 49 years of age. d/ Corresponds to incomplété primary education, 
b/ Corresponds to cities of more than 500 000 inhabitants. e/ Corresponds to complete primary education. 
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Table 4 
SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: PROBABILITY OF DEATH BETWEEN 
BIRTH AND TWO YEARS OF AGE, BY .URBAN AND. RURAL AREA 
Total Urban Rural 
Colombia, 1968-1969 88 75 109 
Costa Rica,,1968-1969 81 60 92 
Chile, ,1965-1966 91 84 112 
Ecuador, 1969-1970 127 98 145 
El Salvador, 1966-1967 145 139 148 
Guatemala, 1968-1969 149 120 161 
Honduras,. 1967-1968 140 113. 150 
Paraguay, 1967-1968 75 69 77 
Peru, 1967-1968 169 132 213 
Dominican Republic, 1970-1971 123 115 130 
Source ; B'ehm, H., et al., "Varios paises. La mortalidad en los primeros afios 
de vida en paises de la America Latina", San José, Costa Rica, CELADE, 
Publication series, various dates. 
Table 5 
SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: PROBABILITY-OF DEATH BETWEEN BIRTH 
AND TWO YEARS OF AGE, ACCORDING TO THE MOTHER'S LEVEL OF 
EDUCATION, 1966-1970 
Mother's number of years of study; Ratio Country Total 
None 1-3 4-6 7-9 10 and over (2)/(6) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Cuba a/ 41 46 45 34 29 
Argentina 58 96 75 59 39 26 3.7 
Paraguay 75 104 80 61 45 27 3.9 
Costa Rica 81 125 98 70 51 33 3.8 
Colombia b/ 88 126 95 63 42 32 3.9 
Chile 91 131 108 92 66 46 2.0 
Dominican Republic 123 172 130 106 81 54 3.2 
Ecuador • 127 176. 134 101 61 - 46 3.8 
Honduras 140 171 129 99 60 35 4.9 
El Salvador 145 158 142 111 58 . 30 5.3 
Guatemala 149 169 135 85 58 44 3.8 
Nicaragua• • 149 168 142 115 73 48 3.5 
Peru c/ 169 207 136 102 77 70 3.0 
Bolivia 202 245 209 176 110 d/ - 2.2 
Source: Behm, H., and Primante, D., Mortalidad en los primeros afios de vida en la 
America Latina, Notas de Poblacion, CELADE, Year VI, No. 16, April 1978. 
a/ Provisional figures from a preliminary study based on the National Survey on 
Income and Expenditure of the Population, 1974. Lengths of schooling are 0, 
1-5, 6 and 7 years and over, 
b/ Lengths of schooling are: 0, 1-3, 4-5, 6-8 and 9 years and over, 
c/ Lengths of schooling are: 0-2, 3-4, 5, 6-9 and 10 years and over, 
d/ Corresponds to 7 years and over. 
~ /Table S 
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Tabls 6 
SELECTED LÄTIN AMERICAN COWRIES: AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO WOMEN 
BETWEEN 20 AND 49 YEARS OF ÄGE WHO HAVE EVER ENGAGED IN A UNION, 
BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, STANDARDIZED 
BY DURATION OF UNION "" 
Woman's level 
of education Total 
Never 
worked 
Worked only Up to 1/3 of 
before the the period 
union in union 
Over 1/3 and 
up to 2/3 of 
the period 
in union 




None 5.22 5.45 4.99 5.17 5.25 ' 5.08 
1-2 years 5.07 5.32 4.88 5.05 5.13 4.91 
3-4 years 4.72 4.99 4.72 4.74 4.48 4.34 
5 years or 
over 4.0? "4.05 4.32 4.52 5.19 3.77 
Secondary . . " 
or higher 3*46 3.75 , 3.72 - 3.38 2,. 78 3.29 
Total 4.60 4.88 4.53 4;56 4.57 4.31 
COSTA RICA• 
None 5.89 5.78 5.72 6.07 4.89a/. 6.61 
1-2 years 5.46 5.43 5.32 5.55 .. 5.76 
3-4 years 4.75 4.87 4.57 4.56 5.03 5.02 
5 years or „ - ... 
over 4.01 4.09 3.89 4.12 4.15 3.91 
Secondary 
or higher 3.00 : 3.25 3.29 2.94 2.75 2.83 
Total 4.42 4.57 ' 4.53 4.43 4.12 4.09 
PANAMA;: 
None 5.09 4.69 5.06 • 4.83 . 7.31a/ 5.54 
1-2 years 5.02 5.05 4.94 5.04 5.88a/ 5.23a/ 
3-4 years 4.82 4.62 4.89 5.02 • 4.37 5.63 
5 years or 
over 4.19 4.26 4.19 4.32 - 3.92 4.10 
Secondary 
or higher 3.22 3.40 3.67 3.25 3.21 2.95 
Total 4.12 4.40 4.36 4.07 3.83 3.69 
PARAGUAY :' 
None 5.28 5.39 5.81 5.01 5.00 5.38 
1-2 years 4.90 5.16 4.97 4.69. ; 4.99 4.66 
3-4 years 4.57 4.93 4.24 0 .4.58 4.52 4.53 
5 years or 
over 3.54 3.75 ;;:; •:. 3.41 .; • . :, . .3.30 3.54 •3.47 . 
Secondary : ; - - - - - • • • • - . • 
or higher 2.65 , 3.02, .. 2.89 ;,-,... 2.44 .. 2.95 2.39 
Total 4.13 4.43 ..... 4.19 4.00 4.11 3.95 
/Table 6 . (concl.) 
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Table 6 (conci.) 
Woman's level 










Over. 1/3 and 
up to 2/3 of 
the period 
in union 




None 5.08 5.35 5.33 4.77 5.21 5.02 
1-2 years 4.83 5.15 4.64 4.88 4.59 4.81 ' 
3-4 years 4.78 4.82 4.52 4„67 4.55 5.06 
5 years or 
over 4.15 ' HI 3.87 ;••..... : .18.. • ..4.28, : •' 4.35 
Secondary 
or higher 3.28 3.60 3„18 3.32 3.43 3.10 
Total 4.57 4» 75 : 4.46 4» 37 ' 4. 47 4.67 
Source: World Fertility Survey, 
a/ Fewer than 25 women. 
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Looking at what happens in the case of education, it may be found that a 
woman with over four years df'p'rimary education reaches an averageof 3.54 children 
in Paraguay, or 4.19 children in Panama. Even if the control applied combines, 
the fact of living in a country's capital city with the woman's educational level, 
the differences may be very great*; A woman who has not completed a single year 
of schooling, living in the capital city of Argentina, may have on an average 
3.14 children, while her counterparts in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and in BogotS, 
Colombia, may have 4.68 and 5.01 children, respectively. At the other end of the 
educational scale, for women with a year or so of university education the average 
figure would be 1.91 children in Buenos Aires, whereas the corresponding numbers 
would be 2.17 in Rio de Janeiro and 3.18 in Bogotg.31/ 
3. Explanation of differences in demographic behaviour 
not covered by the indicators 
In order to go farther than do descriptions based on indicators, recourse should 
be had to the explanatory potential of the economic, social and cultural charac-
teristics of the spatial areas and social groups displaying the most significant 
differences in demographic behaviour. 
With respect to differences by urban and rural areas, the quantitative 
element that is used as an indicator for separately classifying areas of residence 
must be relegated to a secondary place, and what must be taken as essential factors 
in understanding the causal relation are the economic, social and cultural charac-
teristics of the areas in question; not only for the purposes of analysing the 
demographic differences between the broadest cross-sections of urban and rural 
population, but also in order to detect differences by social groups within each 
of these areas and to differentiate behaviour patterns within one and the same 
category. 
On the basis of the stock of knowledge on which a sufficient consensus 
exists, some empirical data and, on occasion, logically-derived hypotheses, a 
line of explanation is presented here which would prove fruitful for policy 
formulation, and which relates to differences by socio-economic areas and social 
groups. There can be no doubt that the lower fertility and mortality rates in 
urban areas are based on the greater relative development of the forces of 
production and the wider diversification of productive activities, with the 
resultant demand for people to fill a bigger variety of jobs, many of them with 
more highly-skilled manpower requirements. All this shapes a social structure in 
which the middle and upper groups represent a relatively substantial proportion, 
and the workers, to a large extent, can be properly incorporated into the 
productive system. Moreover, State action usually makes its presence much more 
strongly felt in urban areas, where the provision of various social services is 
more effective, furthered perhaps by the greater concentration of the population; 
health, education, housing, recreational and cultural services go hand in hand 
with more satisfactory wage policies and much more extensive social security 
systems. 
In the cultural field, the values, beliefs and ideologies supported and 
put into practice by the middle and upper groups are oriented towards emphasis 
on climbing the social ladder; on a type of consumption which has the parallel 
/function of 
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function of representing a symbol of social prestige and. a powerful encouragement 
to change. Upward social mobility is commonly allowed and stimulated by the 
productive and social strata, and is assigned a positive value as a democratic 
ideology. 
This ideal-type charácterization of an urban area serves not only to 
differentiate, it from rural areas, but, above all, to account for inter-urban-area 
differences. Studies on fertility show significant differences between reproduc-
tion rates in one metropolitan area as against another, or in one medium-sized 
city as against another city of the same magnitude.! A similar result can be met. 
with if a comparison is drawn between, fertility rates in one and the same town 
at two points in time, notwithstanding its having undergone no appreciable change 
in its size. 
These differences, sizeable at times., between fertility rates and different 
urban areas are an.indication th^t there are .dissimilarities in some of the 
components of the productive, social or cultural dimension. The urban areas with 
less economic dynamism; with a more deficient labour market, which leaves greater 
relative proportions of their labour force in the so-called "informal market" 
depriving them of their share in the fruits of development; with-a heavier 
preponderance of cultural patterns that do not promote.higher levels of aspirations 
or upward social mobility -which, moreover9 would be impracticable because of the 
insufficient dynamism of production-; these will be the urban areas that will show 
higher fertility rates than others, urban too, but more successful as regards 
their economic, social and cultural dynamics. 
This diversification of fertility patterns between areas that are all urban, 
reflects the heterogeneity of their social structure. A greater or.lesser degree 
of dynamism.in the economic, social and cultural fields would lead, to a different 
distribution of the population among the.upper strata,,the middle groupsworkers . 
in the formal market and. marginal groups outside the formal productive system. 
Given the marked differences in rates: of,fertility between, these groups, where 
among the marginalized propulation the average number of children may be much the 
same as in rural areas ,3_2/ the. average fertility rate in one urban area will be 
higher or lower than in another, according to the proportion of population in 
each of the above-mentioned social groups, and.will depend especially upon the 
proportion of marginal population, not adequately incorporated into the productive 
system, the consumption of goods and services, and the predominant culture. 
As regards fertility rates in rural areas, relatively higher than those 
shown in urban areas, the general explanation is based on the lesser relative 
development of their productive forces; a major share of their population is 
engaged in low-productivity.activities, a situation which is aggravated by long 
standstills due to the particular conditions of agricultural .production. Where 
social development is concerned, according to existing data it is in these, áreas 
that the biggest proportions of population in extreme poverty can be located, and 
the worst shortcomings in respect of education, health, housing, social security 
and sanitation infrastructure. The predominant culture is of a "traditional" type, 
with values and ideologies that do little to encourage change, a low level of 
aspirations and, in general, scanty motivation for upward social mobility, which 
/in market-
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in market-economy countries is a disincentive to any impulse towards family 
planning. In demographic terms, there is also a relative absence of young adults, 
since this is the age group with most propensity to emigration. 
These general characteristics of rural areas do not imply their total 
homogeneity; in practice, in rural areas a scattered population directly linked 
to agricultural activities coexists with other forms of human settlements, which, 
without qualifying for definition as urban, bring together people undertaking 
artisan, commercial arid administrative activities at the service of the farmers 
of the area. Even within agricultural activities proper, a distinction must be 
drawn between large capital-intensive énterprises and similarly large enterprises 
where the productive forces are less developed; alongside these account would have 
to be taken of family enterprises or farms', which may also be differentiated by 
technologies used and greater or lesser productivity. Lastly, consideration 
should be given to the minifundia, which have too little land even to provide work 
for the family labour force". In many countries co-operative enterprises or those . 
resulting from agrarian reform may constitute a new type of agricultural economic 
organization. •''•'. ; . _ ' ' 
The above-mentioned heterogeneity in the structure of prodUctiohwill be 
reflected in a specific degree of social heterogeneity.; Accordingly, a provisional 
distinction could be drawn between the following; gròupsY'noh-agriòùltùraì employees 
living in rural areas; non-agricùltural artisans'living "in rural areas; small-
scale rural landowners; owners of minifundia; wsfrfeefrs;in' capital-intensive 
agricultural enterprises; workers in traditióriàl e^tei?p^iseà; seasonal workers; 
peasant members of agricultural production có-dfjeiifetives, etc. 
What is most' àtriking about this à^ari'àn social heterogeneity, and will 
also most powerfully influence the high ratèS. of fertility; noted, is that it does 
not result in heterogeneous reproductiv&behaviour by social group, as happens 
in urban areas. A glance at the data, Instable2 3 shows that in the twò agricultural 
groups singled out (wage-earners on the;one hand, and employers and own-account 
workers on the other), fertility rates are high and very much alike.35/ 
This peculiar feature of the agricultural situation, where the middle-income 
groups also show a high rate of fertility, calls for special consideration, relating 
to the organization of; àgricultural production and to; some of its particular arid 
closely interrelated cuitur-ài features. '  The historical characteristics of 
agricultural production -labour-intensive and fundamentally based on family 
enterprises- has induced peasants to provide themselves with the necessary labour 
force by having numerous families ; this trend is often strengthened by a relatively 
high level of mortality which compels' them to plan a large number of children. 
This economic explanation, valid for peasants with sufficient land, is no longer 
of use when it comes to Understanding the reproductive behaviour of owners of 
minifundia, much-less s that of landless workers. Hence the cultural formation of 
the area màkès its specific contribution. 
The productive conditions characteristic of the classic peasantry were common 
to all ^àsànt societies in fòrmértimés, and this generalized situation, linked 
to high mortality rates and ato the availability1 of land, led to the creation; 6f 
cultural values which took a positive view of large family sizes. But chàrigés in 
/these conditions 
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these conditions have been unaccbmpanied by any modification of the positive value 
set on children. The owners of.minifundia and landless workers continue to jact. 
in conformity with cultural patterns that in their case are no longer in. keeping. 
with the material base of society, and lead them to produce a number of children 
who can find no work in rural areas and a large proportion of whom will go' to. 
swell the marginal urban groups. Many ethnic communities in Latin America perhaps 
offer the clearest example of dephasing between the material changes in society 
and the permanence of its cultural patterns. 
The foregoing lines of reasoning, designed to show a way of going farther than 
quantitative indicators of urban-rural differences in the quest for the true 
causal factors, can also be applied to analysis of the influence of the educational 
level on fertility. This is possibly the most clearcut instance of the gradual 
delinkage of the indicator from processes it was supposed to interpret. . 
Many studies have regarded education as an acceptable indicator of the 
socio-economic level of individuals, and thence as an indicator of the social 
class or group to which they belong. Other researchers have taken education as an 
indicator of the level of modernization of social actors; applications deriving 
from this approach place the accent on the possibilities of increased dialogue 
between the members of a couple, redounding.to the benefit of more deliberately... 
planned fertility; the same might be said of knowledge of the availability of' ' 
contraceptives, as well as of the ability -which is greater among modern groups-', 
to pick out those which have been found to provide the most effective control. 
Given the diversity of factors that may underlie this educational indicator, 
every analysis should be very clear as to which of these, factors it is dealing 
with, and whether there are new and perhaps more satisfactory indicators, as, for 
instance, occupation and housing conditions, if the aim is to characterize social 
groups « 
A point that will be equally important to clarify is whether education is 
really an indicator of material and cultural aspects of social groups, or whether 
it is a conséquence .of those groups' characteristics. Is it education that brings 
with it socio-economic well-being and modern behaviour pattërns, or is it the middle 
and upper income groups, with economic capacity and .culturally up.-to.-da.te, that 
make most use of education as a means of maintaining that social situation? 
Without disrégarding the. possibilities of thé former, there can be no doubt that 
the latter is more universally true. 
If this is so, the high statistical correlation between education and 
fertility should be reinterpreted, since the real cause of a given reproductive 
behaviour would be the socio-economic capacity of the family and its cultural 
patterns, not education; the latter would really be just one more manifestation 
of the characteristics of the social groups in question, and so would the size of 
their families. The relation between education and fertility would be largely 
spurious in causal methodological terms, since .the association between them would 
be mainly derived from their both being manifestations of another socio-economic 
characteristic with a genuine causal role. 
/This has 
- 34 -, 
This has important implications for policy formulation, since the basis of: 
measures for reducing fertility will no longer be the expansion of education, but 
the structural changes that will lead to the -eradication of poverty ànd'òf1 thè 
marginal situation of numerous social groups, and will motivate them for change. : 
This will mean an increase in educational services, although not as an objective 
in itself, but as a consequence and in the service of the other structural chariges. 
4. Conclusions .". , 
From the foregoing analyses some general conclusions can be derived which are 
placed at the service of the countries as a frame of reference within which they 
could design national-population policies appropriate to each country's individual 
characteristics. The first lays stress on the objective effects that will be 
produced on the reduction of mortality and fertility by the eradication of extreme 
poverty. To the extent that this objective proves economically viable today, in 
accordance with ECLA's affirmations in various documents, and inasmuch as it is 
an intrinsically just objective whose pursuit cannot be deferred, the governments 
of the region should expect a strengthening of downward trends in mortality and 
fertility. 
The same conclusion may be reached with respect to the fulfilment of the 
general, economic and social objectives of development plans and public policies 
implemented by the governments in question. These effects, however, do not occur 
automatically, for which reason they leave some room for government options, both 
as regards the speed of the downward movement and, in some cases, the reversal of 
the trend. In so far as it is impossible 9- besides irrelevant, to formulate a type 
of population policy valid for the countries of the region as a whole, allusion 
will be made under this head only to those elements in the various dimensions of 
society Tjihich are most susceptible of becoming the target of policies designed to 
influence population dynamics. 
The development:style adopted as an economic growth strategy will be one of 
the basic dimensions from the standpoint of its influence on thè pace of demographic 
change. The type of technology used and the extent to which it is incorporated; 
the distribution of the labour force among: the various branches of production; the 
characteristics of>the labour market, the. proportion of population in various 
segments and the higher or lower level of-manpower skills; thè level of wages for 
productive work; in short, the capacity of the economy effectively to incorporate 
the population as a whole into the tasks of production: all these will be: economic 
policy decisions which will create the material bases destined to influence 
population dynamics. ; : .1 . . ' . ; . 
The organization of agrarian production affords the governments of the region 
special opportunities for options, a fact which is the more important because the 
areas concerned are those with the highest rates of natural population growth. 
It should be.borne in mind that since the eradication of extreme poverty will result 
in a lower mortality rate, natural growth in this area will be even greater; but 
the incorporation of the rural population into the production and especially the 
consumer market (generally originating in urban environments) will create-material 
conditions for cultural changes that will lead to a decline in fertility. In this 
same context, the option as to the organization of agrarian production will have 
/a considerable 
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a considerable effect on the size of rural . families: when emphasis is placed, on 
the peasant economy, a relatively high rate of fertility will certainly"be 
maintained, given the association .between available labour supply and number of 
children in the case of small landowners.; in contrast, the entrepreneurial agrarian . 
economy based on a non-family labour market will s.how a downward trend in fertility, 
since it means that there is less point in having, numerous children, in. order to, . 
obtain manpower. . .. . .." 
Social development, in turn, will also tend to bring down mortality and 
fertility, as can be deduced from its negative association with these demographic 
variables. Its repercussions on population growth will depend upon how far it 
affects fertility and how far mortality. Possibilities of an increase in 
population growth will arise if it exerts a stronger influence on the reduction 
of mortality than on fertility, as well as if certain specific measures are adopted 
which offer socio-economic benefits as an incentive to delay a decrease or even 
to promote an increase in the number of children. 
It is to be expected, however, that over the long term social development 
will make for a lower population growth rate; in this sense governments will have 
more possibilities of graduating the decline in the rate of growth. These 
possibilities may take shape through the depth and coverage accorded to health 
policies; the content of maternal-child health plans; the inclusion or exclusion 
of family planning policies; the greater or lesser participation of women in 
economic activity and in the benefits of social development in general; and the 
higher or lesser degree in which all social groups have real access to the various 
goods and social services. 
Cultural factors offer the biggest range of options for influencing fertility 
trends, even over the short term. The effects of economic and social development, 
while contributing to the reduction of mortality, do not play the necessary role 
in relation to family size. Although in the long term that development will 
undoubtedly lead to a low fertility rate, a number of instruments are left in the 
hands of governments which can exert influence to ensure that, idependently of 
economic and social betterment, couples are motivated towards a larger or smaller 
number of children. 
Some of the several instruments which can be used to influence fertility 
trends in one or the other direction are as follows: the content of the messages 
and the cultural and ideological prototypes that are transmitted through the 
mass communication media; the type of values transmitted in the school, concurrently 
with the learning process; the greater or lesser degree of interest in carrying 
urban cultural patterns into rural areas in general and into ethnic communities 
in particular; the wider or more restricted diffusion of the demonstration effects 
stemming from relatively more developed societies, with smaller family sizes, and 
their train of implications on prestige symbols and patterns of consumption. 
/The various 
- 36 -, 
The various economic, social and cultural measures of which mention has been 
made represent suggestions1fdr the formulation! of policies by the governments of 
the region, designed to iniflufence populiatioh dynamics in one direction or another, 
with due regard to eachc'cfountry's individual ch^acteristics. These guidelines 
must be further consolidated through causal arfesearch to establish more exact 
specifications as regards the relations between development and changes in ' 
demographic variables. A particularly important role in this research is incumbent 
on studies to evaluate the real effects that have been produced by public-policies 
proposing to influence, directly or indirectly, population dynamics. 
/III. SOME 
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III. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 
This section presents material contributory to the analysis of the implications 
of demographic change for the economic development of the countries of the region. 
In the first place, some observations may usefully be made, although in" very 
general and synthesized terms, on the way in which population influences . 
development. This relation basically stems from the fact that people are both . 
producers and consumers, and that their participation as such generally varies 
with age and sex. The siae, growth rate and structure of the population by age 
and sex determine the working-age population and the number of consumers. 
However, both participation in economic activity and levels and patterns of 
effective consumption depend upon a set of economic, social and cultural factors. 
The impact of the latter must therefore be evaluated so that the - effect of 
demographic factors can be separately deduced. From the conceptual standpoint,' 
the problem is complicated by the fact that in their turn, the very changes 
induced in participation and consumption influence the demographic variables. 
For example, an improvement in material living conditions resulting from increased 
participation of the population in higher-productivity economic activities will 
bring about changes in fertility and mortality, which are determinants of the 
growth and age structure of the population. These feedback effects must not 
be forgotten, especially when taking the long term into account. 
Population trends, through their influence on production and consumption, 
also have repercussions on many other aspects of development, such as formation 
of savings, investment, incomé distribution and the satisfaction of basic needs. 
It must be pointed out, however, that empirical studies òn the economic 
and social repercussions of population change in Latin America are few and far 
between, and that even at the world level there is much -more controversy as to 
the scale and direction of such effects, than on the factors influencing changes 
in demographic variables. This situation is particularly serious, if it is borne 
in mind that it is precisely the expected consequences of given population trends 
that should be the bases for the adoption of policies designed to modify the 
trends in question. 
In the following pages some considerations are put forward on the growth 
and utilization of the labour force and the implications of urban concentration. 
Among the problems associated with population trends, it is these that are most 
frequently mentioned in development plan diagnoses by the countries of the region. 
1. Population, labour force and employment 
It is estimated that Latin America's labour force expanded, at a steadily increasing 
pace, from 55 million in 1950 to over 113 million in 1980.34/ The growth rate 
of the economically active population (EAP) has been rising since 1950, following 
much the same trend as that of the working-age population. Between 1950 
and 1970 the regions's economically active population grew more slowly than 
total population and the vrorking-age group, but during the last decade it increased 
faster than total population, although somewhat more slowly than the population 
between 15 and 64 years of age. These trends are also observable in a growing 
number of countries. 
/In all 
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In all countries except Argentina and Uruguay, a rising trend can be noted 
in the growth rates of the total as well as of the male and female EAP. The 
female labour force has increased systematically faster than the male, owing 
to opposite trends in the global rates of participation:of; menand women, which 
decrease and increase, respectively, both in the individual countries and in 
the region as a whole. 
The effect of population growth and that of changes in rates of participation 
in economic activity duri.ng .the period 1950-1980 can be evaluated by estimating 
how much the economically active population would have grown if rates of 
participation ,by .sex^and age group had remained constant at the levels observed 
in 1950 in each country. Calculations based on the information mentioned above 35/ 
show that, if there had been no change in participation rates, the region's 
economically active population Would have increased from. 55 to 122 million people, 
i.e., that population growth would have enlarged the labour force by 67 million 
persons; but it in fact increased by only a•little over 58 million, owing to 
the fact that about 9 million people who would have, formed part of the labour 
force if the 1950 partiaipati^p patterns had been maintained, were no longer : 
included in it in -1980. • '̂.v..; :: r , l . . a 
These results are the consequence of quite different behaviour on the part 
of the male and of the female labour force. While in the formed the increase 
deriving from population growth was offset to some extent (25%) by the decrease 
due to the change in participation rates, both factors helped to increase the 
female EAP, and the effect of the change in participation was very substantial 
(almost 40%). Similar conclusions are reached for the great majority of the 
countries of the region. The decliné in men's participation is the result of 
a general downward trend in-the age-specific rates of activity of youth and old 
people, which has been.;associat^d with the increase in schooling, in the former 
case, and in the latter with.ithe wider coverage of social security services. 
In contrast, the globalapartièip^tion rate of women rose during the period under 
consideration becausei'the falltiii; the participation rates of youth and old people 
had a much slighter effect .than the increase'in the rates corresponding to the 
more active age groups,. ... j . 
As has already been said, the labour force in Latin America has expanded 
at a rapidly increasing speed during the last 30 years, largely because of the 
accelerated growth of"the working-age population. >At the same time, with thé 
advance of urbanization, the urban EAP increased much faster1'than the rural; in 
1950 it represented of the total economically active population, and its 
growth in the next three decades brought it up to more than 80% of the whole. 
The available data also provide evidence of the persistence of a serious 
maladjustment between labour supply and demand in all the countries of the region, 
which is reflected in the slowness of the dëcrease in the coverage and intensity 
of underemployment, and in its- increasing Urbanization..36/ Situations and trends 
vary however, from one country to another. In a group which includes Brazil, 
Colombia*'Costa Rica, Guatemalai Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, higher growth 
rates of non-agricultural employment in the modern-sectors were achieved plus 
retentioniof.more workers.employed in the modern sector of agriculture, andJa 
. /sizable reduction 
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sizable reduction in the total rate of underutilization of the labour force. 
In another group of countries9 comprising Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador and 
Peru, the increase in the modern non-agricultural strata is smaller, the reduction 
of agricultural underemployment is slower and total underutilization of the' .. 
labour force shows no signs of decreasing. Lastly,. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
are exceptional cases, by virtue of the degree of modernization of the labour 
force structure, the slow growth of total population, as well as of the total 
and of the non-agricultural EAP population, and the low indices of underutilization 
of the labour force "which they have reached. ' . 
As regards the different trends in underutilization of the labour force 
in the first two groups of countries considered, it should be stressed that the 
lowest indices correspond to the group where investment was highest; this seems 
to be the main determining factor, since there was not much difference .in the 
growth rate of the labour force between the countries and thè two groups.37/, 
This does not mean that the rapid growth of the labour supply has had ño incidence 
on the persistence of underutilization. Its effect was probably significant in 
both cases. 
2. Some implications of the spatial distribution 
of the population 
Diagnoses regarding the spatial distribution trends of the population frequently 
conclude with the identification pf some "critical areas" with regard to which 
it is recommended that corrective action should be taken. These "critical areas" 
are usually linked with a certain perception of the "excessive" degree of urban 
concentration and the "high level" of dispersion of thè rural population. The 
valuative framework or the technical criteria on which such evaluations are based, . 
however, have not always been made explicit. In these conditions, it is extremely 
difficult to know what it is desired to indicate through .the words "excessive" 
and "high level". Bearing in mind the complications presented by an approach 
aimed at the detection of "critical areas" and'the sharp' hetérógerieity,existing 
in Latin America in general and within each country in particular, on the present 
occasion only some economic and social implications of the spatial, concentration 
trends of the population will be considered.38/ 
As part of the set of changes which havé affected the economic and social 
structures of the region, the Latin American population has lost its predominantly 
rural character and has acquired instead án increasingly urban nature. As already 
noted in many previous studies, this urban expansion has been marked by concentration 
in cities with 20 000 inhabitants or more. During the 1950s and 1960s it was 
observed that in addition to the steady overall increase, this concentration was 
particularly marked in the largest cities. Although this trend seems to have 
slackened and even to have shown some signs of being reversed in some countries 
during the 1970s, the growth prospects of the large cities continue to be of 
great significance. There are many consequences usually attributed to this 
process of concentrated urbanization which is so widespread throughout the region.39/ 
/3. Urban 
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3» Urban-metropolitan concentration; fondations 
and dynamics 
Although it is true' "that a number of national policies have been adopted, with 
the aim of checking this-concentration because, of the critical manifestations 
of the prevailing treftds,..experience has shown, that these action, proposals have 
had meagre results even when they have not been a downright failure. Many of 
the diagnoses which serve the.starting point .for these policy formulations 
seem to ignore the fact that the play of the market forces., within a style ¡of 
development which advocates an accumulation process centred around industrialization 
has favoured such concentrâtive tendencies. Geographical concentration cannot 
seriously be considered without also 
global process which.logically tends 
specific factors have .helped to make 
taking into account the-. dimensions of a 
towards concentration.40/ A number of 
the main cities particularly, advantageous 
places for the location of industrial activities and of the whole.complex of 
services which go with themMention may be .made in this respect çf the possibility 
of access to the biggest market in the country,, the better endowment with 
infrastructure, the existence of a big labour force brought together in one place, 
the fact that the national political authorities are usually located there, the 
presence of financial intermediation machinery and that of other producers which 
act as suppliers and consumers of inputs.41/ ' It must not b'è" forgotten, too, 
that many economies of scale are achieved through large technological units. 
It has been observed, moreover, that the, process of concentration, albeit with 
some variations, tends to be self-generating and to create favourable conditions 
for increased scales of production and highej?, productivity.42/ In Brazil, for 
example, it has been sëen that in proportion as the size of "the cities grows, 
there is an increase in the diversification of the economic structure, the average 
size of enterprises; increases, an& also'-the productivity, of labour in industry 
rises as a result of the increase'in-the ratio of capital to labour and the 
existence of economies b£/^cale»43/ This set of considerations helps to show: that 
urban concentration, as part of the overall process of, techno—economic concentration, 
forms a basic cpmponent of the style of development which predominates in .the.Latin 
American countries., .. / . '.''•.' '.'..,. 
The available information permits, it to. be stated that "the main areas of 
concentration of the population are already so large that it is improbable in 
the present circumstances that there could be a substantial reversal of the 
process for a long time-to come".44/ It would appear that the. big cities continue 
to offer favourable conditions, for the functioning of the prevailing style of 
development; the possibilities of. greater productivity continue to be valid in 
these concentrations, calling into question, the prediction of economic theory 
that productivity among, areas would .be. equalized by population migration to 
areas where wages are highest.45/ This, situation is probably due to the fact 
that any possible diseconomies due to tîie, degree of urban concentration have 
nevertheless failed to. outweigh the economies deriving from it , or else such 
diseconomies as exist are.; external .to'tfie enterprises, that is to say, the latter 
do not have to bear the costs of contamination or congestion,-which are shouldered 
by society as à whole. 
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It may therefore be assumed that, just as the ̂ State;helped to create the 
conditions for the establishment of spatial concentration, it is also providing 
the necessary conditions for its strengthening. Inasmuch as.the State represents 
the forces directly involved in the promotion of the prevailing style of 
development, it would not be surprising to find that it is also subsidizing the 
private sector either directly.or indirectly. Thus, the form of resource allocation 
linked with, industrialization leads to a certain degree of inevitability of urban 
concentration, which, in any case, has shown itself to be efficient as regards the 
generation of economies of scale for industrial capital.46/ In these conditions, 
a reduction in public spending on big cities, as an attempt to check their growth, 
could mean a reduction in the economic growth rate. Furthermore, restricting the 
population growth of big cities would mean intervening in their sources of expansion, 
which could mean that the relevant policy would finally amount to reducing the 
growth rate of the countries'1 population.47/ 
If, then, from the point of view of the accumulation process, spatial" 
concentration is functionally efficient, it is important to bear in mind that the 
big cities will continue to exist as a fundamental reality of the spatial 
distribution of the population: as long as the inequality inherent in the form of 
development of the forces of production is maintained, the concentrative tendency 
will continue unchecked.48/ In some countries, it is true, a certain slackening 
in the growth rate of the big cities has been observed, but this does not alter 
the fact that those cities continue to have heavy relative importance and are 
continuing to increase in size in absolute terms. On the other hand, as is 
suggested by the cases of Brazil and Mexico, this "gigantism" could be modified by 
the emergence of new metropolitan agglomeration models in which bag spaces are 
redefined around a central nucleus. Furthermore, it has been noted that once a 
certain level of population has been exceeded, these agglomerations undergo a 
relative decline in their growth rates. Finally, the slackening of the rate of 
concentration should also be understood as part of a general trend towards the 
reduction of urban growth and population increase in the countries.49/ 
The inequalities in the distribution and development of the forces of -- ••'•-•• 
production bring with them inequalities as regards the material living conditions 
of the population.. It is frequently held that these differences lie at the root 
of spatial population movements. Although no recent information is at hand 
regarding the contribution made by migration to the: growth of the big cities, there 
are indications that although this contribution is. still substantial, it has been 
losing relative importahce. A combination of elements of expulsion and attraction 
enter into this population transfer. At all events,-the available evidence tends 
to disprove the negative appraisals made regarding the fate of migrants in the big 
cities. Despite the difficulties associated with their insertion into a different 
environment, it has been establishedthat migrants are not at a disadvantage With 
respect to those born in metropolitan areas as regards "¿coi^mici. and social 
opportunities.50/ It is probable that migration to these: big centres helps the 
social mobility of those who have not been able to improve their socio-economic 
conditions in their birth places, regardless of whether these were urban or 
rural.51/ The implications arising from this information shed, doubt on the 
suggestions sometimes made regarding the desirability of cutting down migration 
to the big cities. 
/An important 
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An important part of the traditional diagnosis regarding-thé "négative" nature 
of urban concentration is connected?with the supposed inability of the big cities^ 
to pffer jobs to their:populations It is reasoned froin this that thèse nuclei are 
merely great accumulations of poverty characterized by their itïâbility to satisfy 
basic needs. There can be no doubt that the big cities form part of the socially 
inequitable situation displayed by the prevailing style of development, and it is 
evident that the unfulfilled needs from which the poorest social groups suffer are 
much more visible in them. Nevertheless, an ECLA study has shown that these big 
cities register per capita incomes which are higher and less inequitably distributed 
than in the territory of the countries where .they are located, considered as à 
whole.52/ The biases, introduced by the generalization of monetary transactions, 
the patterns of consumption of the metropolitan'area and the higher relative cost 
of the means of subsistence, however, give rise to a structure of expenditure which 
restricts the capacity to save and causes generalized indebtedness. It has been 
suggested that this latter situation is associated with the adoption of durable 
goods consumption models by the different urban strata.53/ At all events, the 
evidence indicates, that poverty conditions are more atecentuated in rural areas than* 
in the towns and that the majority of the urban poor aire located outside the 
metropolitan areas,, particularly in the smaller cities.54/ ; • . 
As regards employment, it used to be asserted a few years ago that migration 
to the main urban centres, concealed unemployment; and the steady increase1 in open 
unemployment were problems of growing-seriousness.. While it is true that there has 
been some increase in open unemployment in recent years, as a reflection of the 
world recessive conditions and domestic' crises.j, the corresponding rates do not 
seem to be very high. Although openunemploymentvisan" essentially urban 
phenomenon, it is probable that underemployment -, with:. Unstable employment in low-
productivity activities and: small, and irregular income,: >is actually;of greatër 
significance. Even so, the estiijiates on the underutilization of the labour force 
indicate that such underutilization is proportionally, highér in ruTal areas;55/ 
It cannot be denied, however, that a high percentage of the underemployed are 
located in urban areas, where they constitute what PREALC calls the "informal 
sector".56/ Paradoxically,; it has been-noted that' the percentages ôf urban 
underemployment have been incréasing even though thêcreation.of jobs in modern 
urban activities has been distinguished by its high growth rates. This situation 
seems to be explained by the speed at which„the transfer of population from 
agricultural to urban sectors has taken placèy the high growth rate of the urban 
population of working age,sand the increases in rates, of participation. Many of 
these changes appear to be-linked to-migration. This does not imply that migrants 
basically enter activities of lower productivity, however; even though it is true 
that when they first arrive in the ¡big'cities-some of them work in service 
activities or activities where no special qualifications are required, it has been 
observed that they are gradually incorporated into-the regular•labour market.57/ 
Furthermore, the growth which has taken place in jobs in the so-called "informal 
sector!' in-the big cities, although varying considerably between the différent 
countries of the region, calls-for-more detailed analysis, especially bearing in 
mind the future prospects of.• employment irt the cities;58/ In this.respect, it seems 
beyond doubt that in the lights.of rtMofcresent demographic tendencies and forms of 
participation in economic activity, the labour force of these cities will continue 
/to increase 
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to increase rapidly. The intensity of the pressure for new jobs will persist in 
the years to come, even though the growth rate of these agglomerations goes down. 
These prospects represent an important challenge if. the aim is to provide jobs in 
sectors of higher productivity.59/ 
An important feature of employment in the larger cities consists of the 
higher participation of women in secondary and tertiary sector activities. This 
incorporation of women into urban productive work, which involves incompatibility 
between the roles of mother and worker outside the home, has frequently been 
identified as a factor contributing to the preference for smaller families. 
Together with the fact that women are playing this economic role, the rise in the 
level of schooling and, possibly, the aspirations to rising social mobility are 
elements in urban areas which are associated with a trend towards lower fertility. 
It is considered that the patterns of social interaction which occur in the 
metropolitan environment appear, to have led to changes in the sphere, of 
motivations and attitudes which have profound implications for population growth.60/ 
The effects which these moves may have on the behaviour of migrants is a field 
which has still been only scantily explored. 
4. Organization of the urban space 
Another aspect which has been given a leading place in the concepts predicting 
catastrophic developments as regards the big cities is that of the spectre of 
"marginaiity". The use of this term, even when deprived of. its socio-cultural 
connotations and referring.only to its ecological'significance, is still a subject 
of controversy. It seems more appropriate to consider the situation of the areas 
where the lowest-income strata live as being part of the more genera], process of 
organization of the urban space. From this point of view, the treatment of the 
subject of the popular habitat 61/ as an expression of urban poverty -not just the 
poverty of those who work on their own account, but also of substantial proportions 
of the industrial proletariat- is indissolubly linked with the analysis of the forms 
of appropriation of land, action with regard to housing, urbanization regulations, 
and the policies on the provision of basic services. The control exercised over 
urban land is an element of vital importance in the emergence and deepening of 
social inequalities, as well as being a means for the formation and expansion of 
real estate capital.62/ 
In many of the big cities of Latin America there has been a steady rise .in 
land prices which has had regressive effects on popular housing, making it more 
expensive and forcing the poorest members of the population to crô .d together in 
inner--city slums or move out to peripheral areas lacking basic services., There 
can be no doubt that the population growth in big cities, even when it is 
relatively low, gives rise to increases in absolute terms in the number of 
inhabitants, which aggravates the pressures on land for housing use. When land 
costs increase, the supply is overtaken by demand. Furthermore, the regulations 
on land use frequently contain restrictions on supply which lead to a still greater 
rise, of a speculative nature, in land prices. Financial capital has gradually 
been building up an "integrated" supply of land for urbanization and housing: a 
form of operation which brings big gains (from land rent, profits on capital 
invested in construction, and interest on financial capital), while at the same 
/time helping 
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time helping to accentuate the differences between the different social strata as 
regards their patterns of location. Public investment in the provision of urban 
infrastructurei fòr its part, tends to be concentrated in the higher-income areas, 
thus raising their value,63/ while leaving the needs of the popular strata 
unfulfilled. 
In some countries, the housing policies undertaken by the State have absorbed 
enormous amounts of resources, but frequently action in this field has not had 
redistribuíive effects but on the contrary has assumed regressive features. Thus, 
the tariff and tax concessions granted tend to benefit the construction firms and 
the middle and high-income strata which, because of the inequalities in income 
distribution, are the only ones which can gain access to the financing loans granted 
by the institutions set up to promote an increase in the effective demand for 
housing. "In fact, State housing policies have confirmed or Strengthened. ... the 
relative advantages enjoyed by the middle strata in the urban social structure".64/ 
In view of the conditions prevailing in the region, it is evident that the market 
cannot satisfy the housing needs of an expanding population. There aré many queries 
which could be raised on this matter. One query is connected with the frequently 
observed paradox of the simultaneous shortage of low-cost land arid the existence of 
big vacant lots inside the city limits. Another regards the horizontal -and 
discontinuous- trend observed in the growth of cities, which leads to a rise in 
urbanization costs and restricts the supply of land.. With regard to. housing 
policies, it may be asked "why aré not solutions sought which aré more appropriate 
to the socio-ëconoiJuc status and needs Of thé poorest members of the population? 
Have not these strata shown that they possess the creativeness and initiative to 
solve their housing needs? Why are they viewed as being incapable of participating 
in self-building programmes? Why is private enterprise allowed to carry out this 
task if this means higher costs, the use of more resources, yèt a smaller number of 
solutions?"65/ 
It is interesting, within this line of questioning, to recall that many of the 
Latin American countries where the State adopts a subsidiary role and gives the 
real estate market the status of the fundamental agent for urban development 
nevertheless signed the final report of the United Nations Habitat Conference, with 
its recommendation that "land ... cannot be treated as an ordinary asset, controlled 
by individuals and subject to the pressurés and inefficiencies of the market" ... 
"public control of land use is therefore indispensable to its protection as an 
asset".66/ If this predicament gave rise to a consensus among the povernments of 
the region, this would seem a suitable momënt to see what action has been taken to 
make this consensus a reality. As asserted in a United Nations document: without 
the concept of the social function of property "it is difficult to see how the 
problems of urban development can be solved".67/ : 
5. Environmental détérioration, urban size and 
urbanization costs 
Speculative land management -and the actions and abstention from action of the 
public sector- lëad to a reproduction of the inequalities inherent in the . . . 
predominant development style. The poor, excluded from the real estate markët, are 
relegated to precarious forms of settlement (squatters,: settlements without services 
/in central 
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in central zones and periferal"areas), in which unhealthy conditions help to 
maintain high mortality indices among the lower-income strata. As a manifestation 
of this situation, there are considerable differences in the probability of death 
during the first years of life among the various urban social groups.68/ A large 
part of environmental deterioration appears to be accounted for, then, by the trends 
of social segregation; in order to eliminate the deficiencies present in the lowers-
income districts, a radical reorganization of urban space, accompanied by profound 
changes in income distribution and consumption patterns, would appear to be 
required.69/ ' •••• • 
On the basis of the problems posed, it cannot be concluded that urban size, 
or the growth of the city population, is the basic determining factor in and of 
itself, of poverty or environmental deterioration. Urbanization costs is another 
aspect which must also be considered. Part of the argument against the size of 
the large cities is based oh the financial implications associated with their 
growth. It has been asserted that such nuclei might already have reached such 
dimensions that the diminishing returns on the additional investment required 
might spark "an awareness of the need to combat centralism".70/ The subject of 
urbanization costs is, nevertheless, a great deal more complex. It must first be 
borne in mind, that the expansion and improvement of public services (basic 
sanitation, clean-up and lighting, transport and roads, education and health) not 
only help to raise material living conditions for those who receive them, but also 
play an important role in the performance of industrial and services activities 
located in the cities. 
Although it is often supposed that the larger cities involve higher unit costs 
than the smaller ones, which leads to a belief that growth rates exacerbate 
financial problems, the production of basic services is subject to economies and 
diseconomies of scale and of urbanization which, for the most part, make such an 
assumption invalid. Furthermore, comparisons of public expenditures in cities of 
different sizes pose additional complexities. Firstly, the expenditures of public 
agencies reflect not only components of supply but also of demand (specification 
of the quantity and quality of the services), and these expenditures should 
therefore not be considered as simply being equivalent to the costs. Secondly, 
since each service has its own cost curves -which do not necessarily increase 
steadily as the size of the city grows or the quality of supply rises- it is 
difficult to conduct comparative studies.71/ Considerations of economic efficiency 
have given rise to a widespread controversy about the "optimum" size for a city; 
this is understood as the size at which benefits are maximized and total costs are 
minimized. The debate has been hindered by the fact that, depending- upon the 
perspective of the analysis, there may be different "optimum" sizes. Moreover, 
since empirical curves which would reflect a measurement of total social benefits 
and costs have not been developed, the search for an "optimum" size becomes a 
matter of theoretical interest which does not lead to the specification of practical 
guidelines for public action. 
An important element linked to urbanization costs, environmental deterioration 
and the social organization of urban space is transport. The search for attractive 
surroundings by the higher-income strata, and the strategy for surviving in urban 
spaces of those who do not have access to the real estate market, result in an 
extension of the urban radius. Given the absence of effective controls on land use, 
/this expansion 
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this expansion leads to growing pressure for transport. A.large share of public 
resources, are therefore allocated for the provision of areas for roadways and: the 
establishment of means of; transport. The use of available resources," however, 
reveals profound discrepancies. A. recent estimate showed that 80%; of the transport 
routes of major cities in the region were occupied by automobile owners," which 
represent 20% of the people in transit; only the remaining 20% of the urban road 
surface is available for the 80% of the population transported in buses. Since 
public investments in this sector .also tend to be concentrated in the higher-income 
residential areas -and between these zones and central areas- where the majority 
of all motor vehicles are found, the result is another form of appropriation of the 
use of the city by one social class.,72/ The impact of automobile.use on the lower-
income strata is manifested in higher transport costs, which require a large part . 
of the family budget, as well as in a prolongation of the work day;, both of these 
factors lead to a deterioration in the living conditions of these social groups. 73/ 
Once again, in the case of transport, the costs of the benefits of large: cities are 
borne by the least priviledged sectors. 
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